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[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and
repose is not the destiny of man.1
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
INTRODUCTION

T

HE Supreme Court’s October Term 2009 was a banner one for
federal jurisdiction buffs. Even apart from its usual handful of
standing cases, the Court decided no fewer than eight cases that directly implicated questions of statutory subject-matter jurisdiction.2

1
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 466
(1897).
2
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (considering
jurisdictionality of questions of the extraterritorial reach of a statute); Dolan v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2538–39 (2010) (determining jurisdictionality of the
ninety-day deadline to order restitution under the Mandatory Victims Restitution
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) (2006)); United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct.
1367, 1379 (2010) (assessing jurisdictionality of the precondition to a bankruptcy discharge of a student loan debt that the court find “undue hardship”); Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1245–47 (2010) (analyzing jurisdictionality of 17
U.S.C. § 411(a)); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1194–95 (2010) (considering
how to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for diversity citizenship
purposes); Kucana v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 827, 833–40 (2010) (examining appellate jurisdiction over discretionary actions by the Attorney General in immigration proceedings); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of
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In each case, the Court adopted rules regarding jurisdiction that
were founded upon the value of clarity. For example, in Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, the Court chose a simplified factual test for corporate citizenship under the diversity-jurisdiction statute.3 The Court
intentionally opted for that particular test because of the need for
clear and simple jurisdictional rules, a need that the Court and its
members have recognized in past Terms as well.4
There are good reasons to applaud the Court’s push for clarity in
areas of subject-matter jurisdiction. Jurisdictional uncertainty
causes litigants and courts to spend time and resources establishing
the propriety of the forum when they might be better spent litigating the merits. Uncertainty also leads to mistaken jurisdictional assumptions and exercises of authority, which, if later discovered,
will undo all of the effort expended in that improper forum. For
these reasons, one commentator recently asserted that “[j]ust
about nobody, it seems, thinks that jurisdictional rules should be
fuzzy.”5
Call me a skeptic. Although I generally agree with the value of
jurisdictional clarity as an ideal, the reality is that jurisdictional
clarity is largely a chimera, done in by its own inherent complexities. Worse, these complexities are either missed or ignored, leading to the routine assumptions that clarity in jurisdictional rules is
both attainable and an unalloyed good. This Article calls those assumptions into question and offers a more refined understanding
of the surprising complexity and obscurity of jurisdictional clarity.
It does so in five parts.
Part I makes and defends the descriptive claim that there is a
wide gap between the rhetoric of courts and commentators favoring clarity and simplicity in areas of subject-matter jurisdiction and
the pervasive uncertainty in those doctrines today. In other words,
although judges and commentators often invoke jurisdictional clar-

Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 595–96 (2009) (deciding jurisdictionality of the Railway
Labor Act’s conference requirement); Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599,
606–07 (2009) (assessing appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from a
privilege order).
3
Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192.
4
See infra text accompanying notes 25–27.
5
John F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. Cin. L. Rev.
145, 167 (2006).
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ity and appear committed to it, jurisdictional doctrine is, in many
instances, neither clear nor simple. Reality defies ideality.
Part II then turns to the nature of jurisdictional clarity and situates it within two great conversations on jurisdictional doctrine: the
ageless debate between rules and standards and the more recent,
but no less rich, debate between mandatory and discretionary jurisdiction, most prominently forged by Martin Redish and David
Shapiro. This Part argues analytically that these debates are related
to, but mostly dissociated from, the push for jurisdictional clarity.
A standard, for example, can be clear, while a rule may be unclear.
Similarly, a discretionary doctrine can be clear, while a mandate
may not be. To be sure, jurisdictional clarity tends to have attributes of rules and mandates, but it is both wider and more complex
than the existing conversations capture. That has left jurisdictional
clarity severely underexplored.
Part III begins to fill that gap by unpacking jurisdictional clarity
and laying bare the first assumption inherent in the rhetoric described in Part I, that jurisdictional rules can be simple and clear.
In truth, jurisdictional clarity is a byzantine complex of at least
three interrelated intricacies.
First, clear and simple jurisdictional lines are often extremely
difficult to draw. The policies underlying jurisdiction and jurisdictional allocation are difficult to ascertain and are often antithetical
to each other. As a result, accommodating those competing policies
through a clear jurisdictional rule is no easy task. In addition, neither of the institutions (Congress or the courts) that develop jurisdictional doctrine is particularly good at it. Congress lacks the institutional expertise of dealing with jurisdiction, while the courts lack
the institutional capacity to develop clear ex ante rules. The suboptimality of the rulemaker leads to confusion and uncertainty in rule
promulgation. Further, the ideal of “clear and simple” rules leads
to the unanswered question, “Clear to whom?” Different target
observers have different vantage points. Lay observers, because of
their inexperience with the intricacies of jurisdiction, need more
clarity than do lawyers and judges and respond more forcefully to
clarity in results as opposed to clarity in abstract doctrine. Consequently, even when jurisdictional doctrine is clear and simple for
one group, it may be unclear or appear distorted to another. Finally, when clear jurisdictional lines are available and easily dis-
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cernible, difficulty arises in choosing where to establish that clear
boundary, for that decision itself implicates a thorny set of jurisdictional policies. For these reasons, the task of crafting a clear rule
can present formidable obstacles.
Second, jurisdictional clarity is complicated by the implementation process. Even the clearest and simplest rule has fuzziness at
the margin, and that fuzziness often becomes magnified by judicial
interpretation. Further, the factual application of even a clear rule
can be exceedingly convoluted, particularly if the inquiry is dependent upon facts that, as is often the case, are difficult to ascertain or prove at the outset of the litigation. In short, implementation can cloud the best attempts at clarity and simplicity.
Third, the instrumental value of jurisdictional clarity depends
upon its particular goals, which have never been fully stated. True,
the regular mantra is that jurisdictional clarity is important to conserve litigation and judicial resources and to enhance judicial legitimacy. But there are different ways to structure jurisdictional
clarity to achieve these goals. And there are unstated goals of
streamlining inter- and intra-branch relationships that complicate
the use of jurisdictional clarity considerably. Together, these three
difficulties demonstrate that the ability to attain the ideal of jurisdictional clarity and simplicity should not be presumed.
Part IV then tackles the second assumption of the rhetoric, that
jurisdictional clarity is an unalloyed good. Jurisdictional clarity can
be attained, but only at a price. That price includes jurisdictional
clarity’s unavoidable vices and the opportunity cost of reaping jurisdictional uncertainty’s attractive virtues. The price of jurisdictional clarity may ultimately be worth it, but there are reasons to
appreciate the limits of jurisdictional clarity and the benefits of
more nuanced doctrine, particularly when getting the forum right
matters significantly.
Part V uses the previous Parts’ exploration of jurisdictional clarity to advance two observations. First, it suggests an answer to the
divergence between reality and rhetoric noted in Part I: the ideal of
jurisdictional clarity is practically unattainable. Second, it argues
normatively that, in any case, jurisdictional clarity ought not be
overvalued; the inherent complexity and uncertainty in jurisdictional doctrine can be harnessed to forge a better jurisdictional
landscape through hybrid rules.

DODSON_PRE_PP

6

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:1

I conclude by asserting that, at the very least, simply repeating
the mantra that jurisdictional rules should be simple and clear—as
both courts and commentators often do—is unhelpful and potentially misleading without a full appreciation of the complexity of
jurisdictional clarity.
I. THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND DOCTRINE
Martha Field once wrote, “One of the first things we teach entering law students is the importance of clarity in rules governing
courts’ jurisdiction.”6 Courts and commentators widely share this
sense of the importance of jurisdictional clarity. Surprisingly, however, the doctrines themselves do not reflect it.
A. The Rhetoric of Jurisdictional Clarity
Because of the special nature of jurisdiction,7 the need for clarity
in jurisdictional rules is different from the need for clarity in substantive, or even procedural, law. Jurisdiction allocates judicial authority between the federal and state judicial systems, between the
judicial system and executive agencies, among courts within a judicial system, and even between an adjudicatory system and no adjudicatory system.8 On a practical scale, it is a component of court access.9 Because jurisdiction circumscribes a court’s adjudicatory
authority,10 a court that determines that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction has no authority to do anything but dismiss the case.11
6
Martha A. Field, The Uncertain Nature of Federal Jurisdiction, 22 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 683, 683 (1981).
7
I note that “jurisdiction” is a word of many meanings. See, e.g., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 88–90 (1998) (noting the importance of precision
in applying the “jurisdictional” label). Here and throughout, I mean to refer only to
subject-matter jurisdiction rather than personal jurisdiction.
8
See Alex Lees, Note, The Jurisdictional Label: Use and Misuse, 58 Stan. L. Rev.
1457, 1460 (2006).
9
See Gene R. Nichol, The Roberts Court and Access to Justice, 59 Case W. Res. L.
Rev. 821 (2009).
10
See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004). For excellent expositions of jurisdiction as distinguished from merits and procedure, see Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious
Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 Hastings L.J. 1613 (2003); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on a Trichotomy, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1547
(2008).
11
I note that the Court has held that a court can dismiss a case on non-jurisdictional
grounds before it determines if it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sinochem
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Policies underlying federal-jurisdiction doctrine primarily focus
on societal, rather than litigant, values: protection of federal rights
and interests, comity and federalism, allocation of judicial resources and docket control, and uniformity.12 Because jurisdiction
goes to a court’s basic authority over the case and protects underlying societal values,13 defects in jurisdiction “can be raised by any
party or the court sua sponte; may not be consented to by the parties; are not subject to principles of estoppel, forfeiture, or waiver;
and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal.”14
These features of jurisdiction entail significant costs for courts
and litigants. A jurisdictional defect raised late in the proceedings
can undo all of the litigation time and effort the parties and court
have spent. But the idea is that the policies underlying jurisdiction
are too important to trust to litigants, and so the costs are accepted
as part of the price of protecting those values.
Jurisdictional clarity can mitigate some of the litigant costs by
enabling litigants to file in the proper forum more often.15 A clearer
Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007). For more on the implications of decisional sequencing on jurisdictional issues, see Kevin M. Clermont,
Decisional Sequencing: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion (Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers, Paper No. 77, 2010), available at
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1080&context=clsops_p
apers.
12
See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 530,
550–54 (1989). That said, and as I argue below, private values can be important to jurisdictional demarcations as well. In addition, the costs to individual litigants from
harsh jurisdictional effects are private concerns that inform jurisdictional thinking.
These private values further complicate the ideal of jurisdictional clarity. See infra
text accompanying notes 137–48.
13
For more detailed explorations of jurisdictionality, see Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 1, 36–37 (1994); Scott
Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 55, 60 (2008); Lee,
supra note 10, at 1613–21.
14
Dodson, supra note 13, at 56. It appears that, in the early years of American
courts, subject-matter jurisdiction was waivable in certain instances, and courts relied
almost exclusively on the pleadings to determine jurisdiction without holding detailed
factual hearings. See Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 Va. L.
Rev. 1829, 1836–43 (2007).
15
See Eric Kades, The Law & Economics of Jurisdiction 4 (William & Mary Law
Sch., Working Paper No. 09-11, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1431959
(“[T]he complexity of federal jurisdiction likely results in many unintentional, erroneous federal court filings.”). I should note that if the parity between federal and state
courts is high, jurisdictional uncertainty may simply cause plaintiffs to choose state
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doctrine also should cause parties to challenge jurisdiction less often and decrease the likelihood that a jurisdictional defect will unravel the litigation16 or even preclude the claim if a limitations period has run in the interim.17 Jurisdictional uncertainty can do the
opposite. One study, for example, reported a sixty-six percent error
rate in invocation of federal jurisdiction under the relatively unclear “substantiality” component of federal “arising under” jurisdiction.18 By contrast, jurisdictional clarity generally reduces litigant costs.19
Jurisdictional clarity can also reduce judicial costs because, when
jurisdiction is at issue, courts will be able to resolve the issue more
easily. Because jurisdiction must be policed by the court sua sponte
and often without diligent briefing by the parties (particularly if
both parties wish to remain in federal court), a clear jurisdictional
rule has great appeal to the judge. And, when the court does resolve a jurisdictional issue under clear doctrine, that decision is
likely to be accurate, causing fewer appeals and fewer reversals.20
Jurisdictional clarity also can enhance judicial legitimacy. The
transparent judicial enforcement of a clear statutory rule of jurisdiction negates the democratically problematic perception of unauthorized judicial lawmaking.21 Clear jurisdictional doctrine also recourt, where concurrent jurisdiction exists, to avoid the risk of an erroneous jurisdictional filing. As a result, jurisdictional uncertainty may not result in substantially more
filing errors. But, “these same convoluted rules of jurisdiction, turning as they frequently do on facts known by one party and difficult to discover by their adversary,
create opportunities to exploit this asymmetric information intentionally and obtain
two bites at the apple.” Id.
16
Field, supra note 6, at 683–84.
17
Cf. Catherine T. Struve, Time and the Courts: What Deadlines and Their Treatment Tell Us About the Litigation System, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 601, 629–31 (2010)
(discussing the importance of deadlines to lawyers and litigants).
18
See Preis, supra note 5, at 166. This study was based on circuit court determinations that federal jurisdiction was improperly invoked. Id. at 159.
19
See Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1891, 1906 (2004) (discussing litigant need for predictability in jurisdictional
rules). Some of this prospective waste is overstated because parties who litigate deep
into the merits may know enough about each other’s cases that settlement, rather
than relitigation, becomes the most likely scenario.
20
Conversely, uncertainty tends to foster inaccuracy. One study, for example, found
that roughly fifty-five percent of appellate cases on the “substantiality” component of
federal “arising under” jurisdiction were reversals. See Preis, supra note 5, at 165.
21
Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175,
1176 (1989) (“Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate clarity or pre-
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duces the legitimacy cost of a court erroneously exercising jurisdiction when it cannot.22 Unclear jurisdictional doctrine, by contrast,
can lead to manipulation of that doctrine for merits-based ends,
again leading to an erosion of public confidence in the courts.23
These are powerful arguments. It is no surprise, then, that they
lead to the conventional wisdom about jurisdictional rules. Jurisdictional rules should be simple and clear, the mantra goes, to allow jurisdiction to be determined early, easily, and cheaply, and to
avoid the potential waste of litigant and court resources.24 Courts
and commentators regularly invoke this easy rhetoric.
A good expression of this mantra in jurisdictional doctrine, and
one to which I will return throughout this Article, is the wellpleaded complaint rule for federal statutory “arising under” jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The Supreme Court has held that
the jurisdictional basis for Section 1331 jurisdiction must appear on
the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint, thus excluding
from that statute’s jurisdictional grant federal counterclaims and
defenses.25 The primary motivation for the rule is that whether the
plaintiff’s complaint raises a federal question is (usually) clear,
simple, and readily ascertainable.26
cision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic—and, in the extreme, unconstitutional—because they leave too much to be decided by persons other than the people’s representatives.”).
22
See Lee, supra note 10, at 1622 (tying jurisdiction to legitimacy).
23
See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 1870–1958, at 244–48 (1992).
24
See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Some Problems of Equity 310–16 (1950) (arguing
that jurisdiction should be easily and readily ascertainable); Field, supra note 6, at 683
(“One reason for jurisdictional rules to be clear and simple is that litigating at length
over the proper forum in which to litigate is a poor use of limited judicial resources,
expensive to the parties and to the public.”); Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 Va. L. Rev. 1769, 1794 (1992) (“[J]urisdictional uncertainty can surely lead to both a waste of judicial time and added expense to the
litigants.”).
25
Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 832 (2002) (extending the rule to federal counterclaims); Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (applying the rule to federal defenses).
26
See Jack H. Friedenthal et al., Civil Procedure 22 (2d ed. 1993) (“The wellpleaded complaint rule fulfills a useful and necessary function. Given the limited nature of federal subject matter jurisdiction, it is essential that the existence of jurisdiction be determined at the outset, rather than being contingent upon what may occur
at later stages in the litigation.”); Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in
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This rhetoric is not unique to the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The Supreme Court and individual Justices, from Brennan to Thomas, have urged jurisdictional clarity in a variety of other contexts
using similar rhetoric.27 One example from just this past Term is
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, in which the Court considered what test to
use to determine a corporation’s principal place of business for
citizenship purposes under the diversity-jurisdiction statute.28 Determining principal place of business had proved difficult in some
cases, and courts of appeals had crafted a number of different tests.
Some followed the “nerve center” test, finding principal place of
business where the corporation had its corporate headquarters.
Search of Definition, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1781, 1783 (1998) (explaining that the wellpleaded complaint rule “prevents the disruption, to both the system and the litigants,
of shifting a case between state and federal fora in the middle of an action as federal
issues arise or fall out”).
27
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 320–
22 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging a return to the simpler Holmes test for
statutory “arising under” jurisdiction); Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541
U.S. 567, 582 (2004) (“Uncertainty regarding the question of jurisdiction is particularly undesirable, and collateral litigation on the point particularly wasteful.”);
Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 829–32 (extending the well-pleaded complaint rule to the
exclusive patent jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit because a contrary rule “would
undermine the clarity and ease of administration of the well-pleaded-complaint doctrine, which serves as a ‘quick rule of thumb’ for resolving jurisdictional conflicts”
(quoting Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 11 (1983))); Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 621
(2002) (explaining, in adopting a bright-line waiver test for state sovereign immunity,
that “jurisdictional rules should be clear”); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549–56 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (seeking a clear test for admiralty jurisdiction); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S.
33, 50 (1990) (expressing a concern for “the stability and clarity of jurisdictional
rules”); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 350 n.27 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[J]urisdictional rules must be clear cut and cannot turn on
indefinite notions of ‘importance’ or ‘wide-ranging impact.’ ‘[L]itigants ought to be
able to apply a clear test to determine whether, as an exception to the general rule of
appellate review, they must perfect an appeal directly to the Supreme Court.’” (quoting Heckler v. Edwards, 465 U.S. 870, 877 (1984))); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 510 & n.7 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (seeking clarity for the finality
rule in appellate jurisdiction and asserting that “[c]larity is to be desired in any statute, but in matters of jurisdiction, it is especially important. Otherwise the courts and
the parties must expend great energy, not on the merits of dispute settlement, but on
simply deciding whether a court has the power to hear a case” (quoting United States
v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267, 307 (1970))).
28
130 S. Ct. 1181, 1190–95 (2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), which deems a
corporation to be a citizen of both its state of incorporation and the state “where it
has its principal place of business”).
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Others followed the “business activity” test, finding principal place
of business where the corporation had most of its operations. Others followed the “total activity” test, a hybrid of the two.29
The Supreme Court in Hertz basically adopted the “nerve center” test and held that “principal place of business” refers to the
place where the corporation’s high-level officers “direct, control,
and coordinate the corporation’s activities,” which in most cases
will likely be its “nerve center,” or where its headquarters is located.30 The Court adopted this test in large part because of its
clear and simple application:
[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional
statute. Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up
time and money as the parties litigate, not the merits of their
claims, but which court is the right court to decide those claims.
Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and factual merits. Judicial resources too are at stake. Courts have an independent obligation
to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even
when no party challenges it. So courts benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure themselves of
their power to hear a case.
Simple jurisdictional rules also promote greater predictability
31
[for both plaintiffs and defendants].

Thus, the rhetoric urging clarity and simplicity in jurisdictional
rules is alive and well in both academic and judicial circles. And,
for the reasons noted above, the rhetoric is powerful and welljustified.
B. The Lack of Clarity in Existing Doctrine
It is perhaps surprising, then, that existing jurisdictional doctrine
largely does not reflect the clarity and simplicity that the rhetoric

29

Id. at 1191.
Id. at 1192.
31
Id. at 1193 (citations omitted); see also id. at 1185–86 (“[W]e place primary weight
upon the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible.”).
30
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urges.32 A classic example is the well-pleaded complaint rule’s sister
doctrine—the meaning of “arising under” in Section 1331. In 1916,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously incorporated the value of
clarity into a simple and characteristically pithy test by proclaiming
that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.”33
Yet the Supreme Court promptly departed from that formulation
just five years later, leaving Justice Holmes in dissent.34 Instead, the
Court adopted (some might say, returned to35) a more malleable
standard36 that, under modern doctrine, extends federal-question
jurisdiction to state-law claims implicating an important and substantial federal interest.37 As Justice Thomas has noted, such a
standard for nonfederal claims “is anything but clear.”38
Another useful example is the test for admiralty tort jurisdiction.
The traditional test for such jurisdiction asked only whether the
tort occurred on navigable waters.39 Congress subsequently codified
that rule in the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act.40 The
Court nevertheless interpreted this grant to require “that the
wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.”41 This interpretation led to the following two-part test for admiralty jurisdiction: “whether the incident has ‘a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce,’” and “whether ‘the general
32

Cf. Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 75, 114 (1998) (finding empirical evidence that
federal-jurisdiction opinions have more obfuscatory linguistic devices than do substantive law opinions).
33
Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). Notably,
though, some have criticized even Justice Holmes’s formulation as unclear. See Field,
supra note 6, at 687–88 (making this point based on “the great flexibility that exists in
determining whether a federal cause of action exists”).
34
Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921); id. at 214–15
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (adhering to his American Well Works formulation).
35
See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and
Justice Holmes, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2151, 2153 (2009) (claiming that Smith-type
claims were the norm before the early 1900s).
36
Smith, 255 U.S. at 199 (allowing federal jurisdiction over a state claim dependent
on the construction of federal law).
37
See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313–14
(2005).
38
Id. at 321 (Thomas, J., concurring).
39
See, e.g., Thomas v. Lane, 23 F. Cas. 957, 960 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Me.
1813) (No. 13,902).
40
46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006).
41
Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
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character’ of the ‘activity giving rise to the incident’ shows a ‘substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.’”42 As Justice
Thomas again has noted, such a standard is “[v]ague and obscure,”
resulting in “wasteful litigation.”43 He would return to the “simple,
clear” locality test.44
Other examples abound. The finality rule for appellate jurisdiction,45 abstention doctrines,46 discretionary decline of supplemental
jurisdiction,47 and standing48 all are jurisdictional doctrines notable
for their lack of clarity and simplicity. True, a few jurisdictional
rules could be characterized as clear or at least moving in that direction.49 In the main, though, jurisdictional doctrine is riddled with
42
Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534
(1995) (quoting Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 364–65 (1990)). In Executive Jet Aviation and Grubart, the Court was interpreting the original language of the Extension of
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act; the language has since changed stylistically. Compare
Pub. L. No. 695, 62 Stat. 496, 496 (1948) (extending admiralty jurisdiction to “all cases
of damage or injury, to person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated on land”), with
46 U.S.C. § 30101 (2006) (stating that admiralty jurisdiction “includes cases of injury
or damage, to a person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable waters, even
though the injury or damage is done or consummated on land”).
43
Grubart, 513 U.S. at 549, 556 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
44
Id. at 550 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
45
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485–86 (1975) (articulating standards-based exceptions to the finality rule); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,
337 U.S. 541, 546–47 (1949) (articulating standards-based interpretations of “final”).
For an indictment of the opacity of the current appellate-jurisdiction doctrine, see
Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 1237, 1237–
39 (2007).
46
See Field, supra note 6, at 696–98, 720 (arguing that the abstention doctrines are
unclear).
47
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (listing four factors courts should consider when determining whether to retain or decline supplemental jurisdiction).
48
See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221, 290 (1988)
(stating that the requirements of standing are difficult to apply and “cannot be made
easy”); cf. Field, supra note 6, at 709–10 (“[T]he criteria for justiciability are sufficiently elastic that it is ultimately unpredictable [in certain cases involving constitutional challenges to state criminal statutes].”).
49
The well-pleaded complaint rule above is a good example. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. Others have suggested that diversity jurisdiction is largely defined and clear. See Field, supra note 6, at 694 (“[D]iversity jurisdiction generally is
unlike federal question jurisdiction in that many of its basic issues are clear and easy
to apply.”); Jonathan R. Nash, Instrument Choice in Federal Court Jurisdiction:
Rules, Standards, and Discretion 13 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-92, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553584 (arguing that, with a few exceptions, “it is very safe

DODSON_PRE_PP

14

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:1

uncertainty and complexity.50 Indeed, virtually every jurisdictional
doctrine contains opacity that the Court continues to defend, despite its simultaneous rhetoric to the contrary.
This gap between rhetoric and reality has a number of possible
explanations. Stare decisis,51 a silent penchant for flexibility and
discretion,52 a muted dissatisfaction with jurisdictional rules in certain areas,53 a genuine belief that Congress intended such uncertainty,54 and more creative explanations55 are all possibilities. My
aim is not to disprove these but rather to suggest an additional possibility: that jurisdictional clarity can be self-defeating. Despite the
oversimplified rhetoric urging clarity and simplicity in jurisdictional
rules, the concept itself is inherently complex, uncertain, and difficult. As a result, attaining jurisdictional clarity is practically impossible, and it is no small wonder that attempts to do so have fallen
short or been abandoned.

to say that rules dominate the boundaries of federal diversity jurisdiction under section 1332”).
50
See Field, supra note 6, at 684 (“[T]he more one studies federal jurisdiction, the
more forcefully one must conclude that much uncertainty surrounds the decision of
many federal jurisdictional issues.”).
51
Stare decisis may help explain Grable and Grubart, or at least why certain Justices
joined in those decisions. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 317 (2005); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,
513 U.S. 527, 554 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment).
52
See Field, supra note 6, at 724 (“[T]he flexibility the jurisdictional rules provide in
their undeveloped state can prove useful to judges, allowing them to dispose of difficult cases without having directly to discuss the moral, social, or political value judgments behind those dispositions.”).
53
See Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: Reconciling Statutory Limitations
on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 Ind. L.J. 309, 342 (2007) (“Though many still
clamor for application of the Holmes test for centrality, that test just does not
work. . . . [It] fail[s] . . . to ensure a federal trial forum, with federal expertise, for the
sensitive interpretation of federal law, free from state-court biases.”).
54
Longstanding congressional silence in the face of a consistent judicial interpretation of a statute can imply a congressional intent that the statutory language continue
to be interpreted that way. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 593–
94 (2004). In addition, some statutes seem themselves to be invitations for jurisdictional uncertainty. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2006) (allowing courts to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if, in “exceptional circumstances,” there are
“compelling reasons”).
55
See Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 971, 995–96
(2009) (arguing that jurisdictional rhetoric can be intentionally misleading, but for
salutary purposes); Little, supra note 32, at 129–39 (suggesting several explanations
for the high level of obfuscatory language in federal jurisdiction opinions).
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II. DISSOCIATING CLARITY
Explaining why clarity can be so complex and unclear begins
with explaining why the existing discourse does not capture the
concept. Two major conversations are relevant to jurisdictional
clarity: rules versus standards and mandate versus discretion.
These are useful to the issues of jurisdictional clarity, but jurisdictional clarity is both broader and more complex. Clarity, in other
words, is its own conversation.
A. Rules and Standards
The debate between rules and standards has a rich pedigree.56
Although commentators have struggled to define and separate
rules and standards with precision,57 at a basic level, there are large
areas of agreement. A rule is a norm that is enforced according to
its terms rather than the policies animating it.58 A standard, by con-

56

For a very small sampling of the rich literature exploring rules and standards generally, see Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of
Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976); Scalia, supra note 21; Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 379 (1985); Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog,
123 Harv. L. Rev. 1214 (2010); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 22 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Cal. L.
Rev. 953 (1995). For recent attempts to adapt that debate to jurisdictional doctrine,
see Freer, supra note 53; Preis, supra note 5, at 167–92; Nash, supra note 49.
57
See Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism and Trivial Cases, 14 Harv. J.L.
& Pub. Pol’y 823, 828–32 (1991) (stating that rules and standards themselves lack precise definition or categorization); Jeffrey R. Lax, Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law 10–11 (June 9, 2009) (unpublished manuscript,
available at www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/Rules%20vs%20Standards.pdf) (asserting
that academic attempts to distinguish between rules and standards are inherently difficult). Often, the terms are conceptualized not as binary but rather as nodes on a continuum, existing with other nodes as well. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 56, at 963–64
(including “factors”); Legal Theory Lexicon 026: Rules, Standards, and Principles,
http://lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2004/03/legal_theory_le_3.html (Mar.
7, 2004) (including “principles”).
58
Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing: A Review Essay of Cass R. Sunstein’s
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 531, 541 (1997). In this
Part, I use the term “rule” in the narrow sense of the term as it is used in the rules
versus standards conversation. Elsewhere, though, I use it in the generic sense that
legal “rules” generally encompass all kinds of norm codification, including tests based
upon standards.
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trast, is the attempt to enforce those policies more directly.59 Thus,
“Speed Limit 65” is a rule; “drive at a safe speed” is a standard.60
Rules and standards have different effects. Rules restrict the discretion of the decisionmaker to determining if a predetermined set
of facts exists.61 By contrast, standards are more inclusive about the
particular facts the decisionmaker can consider based on the individualized circumstances of the case.62 To illustrate, “Speed Limit
65” specifies the facts to be considered, while “drive at a safe
speed” is relatively open-ended and allows for considerable flexibility in application. As a normative matter, the more one trusts
lower courts’ ability to accurately assess and enforce jurisdictional
policies, the more one should favor standards.63 By contrast, those
who favor rules tend to be pessimistic about judicial discretion.64
These differences lead to a fairly well-accepted set of pros and
cons for rules and standards. Because rules set a predetermined
condition that allows for little discretion, they generally provide
better ex ante certainty, predictability, and fairness across cases,
leading generally to fewer cases of primary actor failure.65 They
also often are easier for courts to apply.66

59

See Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58.
See Alexander, supra note 58, at 541–42.
61
Freer, supra note 53, at 311 (“A rule affords the decisionmaker no discretion, but
cabins its inquiry to whether a given set of facts exists. A standard, in contrast, affords
the decisionmaker greater discretion by prescribing a series of relevant factors to be
weighed in view of a policy goal.”); Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58 (explaining that a
rule “binds a decisionmaker” to a particular outcome if certain delimited facts are established).
62
See Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58–59 (asserting that a standard allows for consideration of all facts); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 965 (explaining that the application of
a standard can only be done post hoc).
63
See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 Va. L. Rev. 347, 398 (2005).
64
Alexander, supra note 58, at 543. The normative positions are generally regarded
as “formalist” (those who urge judges to decide cases based on rules) and “instrumentalist” (those who urge judges to decide cases based on standards). See, e.g., Larry
Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 530, 531 (1999).
65
See Russell B. Korobkin, Behavior Analysis and Legal Form: Rules vs. Standards
Revisited, 79 Or. L. Rev. 23, 36–39 (2000). But see Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1220–21
(suggesting that, at least in some contexts, standards can reduce primary actor failure
by forcing primary actors to think more carefully about their conduct).
66
See Schauer, supra note 56, at 229–30; Alexander, supra note 58, at 542–43; Kaplow, supra note 56, at 571, 581.
60
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But standards have their advantages. Standards usually are more
closely aligned with their underlying norms because standards incorporate those norms directly.67 Rules, by contrast, suffer from
both overinclusion and underinclusion because they capture the
underlying policies inaccurately.68 In addition, standards are easier
and cheaper to develop ex ante.69 Standards also are likely to be
fairer as applied to any given case and are more adaptable to
changing circumstances that might make a rule obsolete.70 Standards generally are less susceptible to manipulation by litigants.71
Finally, standards regulating primary conduct can induce salutary
“moral deliberation” within primary actors.72 At first blush, one
might think that the debate between rules and standards fully captures the issues of jurisdictional clarity. Rules, after all, seem to be
the paradigm of clarity and simplicity because of their better predictability and ease of application.
But that is not necessarily the case. Rules may be neither clear
nor simple, and standards can be both. Recall that a rule mandates
an outcome based on predetermined facts; a norm can fit that description while also being both uncertain and complex. Indeed, as
Peter Schuck has demonstrated, rules can be extremely complex
due to the cumulative effect of “density, technicality, differentiation, and indeterminacy.”73 This often occurs when the desire to
maximize accuracy in rules leads to conditions and exceptions
(even if those conditions and exceptions are themselves rules).74
Sticking with the driving example, a complex rule might be:
Speed Limit 65, except (a) if you are driving a truck after sundown, Speed Limit 55; (b) if you are a police officer in pursuit of
a suspect, Speed Limit 85, but you must have sirens and lights on;
(c) drive five miles per hour slower for each inch per hour of
67

Sullivan, supra note 56, at 58–59.
Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 56, at 957, 992–93.
69
Kaplow, supra note 56, at 591.
70
See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992–96.
71
Id. at 995. The well-pleaded complaint rule, for example, can lead to artful pleading attempts by plaintiffs, a form of jurisdictional manipulation to avoid removal.
Miller, supra note 26, at 1783.
72
Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1217.
73
Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42
Duke L.J. 1, 3 (1992).
74
See Sunstein, supra note 56, at 962.
68
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rainfall; (d) drive five miles per hour slower for each inch of accumulated snow; (e) yield for all official emergency vehicles; (f)
do not drive at all if your blood alcohol level is 0.08% or higher,
and so on.

The tax code is an easy real-world example,75 and diversity jurisdiction under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), with its
numerous requirements and exceptions, is a good jurisdictional example.76 In short, if accuracy is a concern, then the more rule-like
the rule, the more complex it will have to be.
Rules also can be unclear. To take the driving example from the
preceding paragraph, it might be extremely difficult for a driver,
enforcing officer, and criminal jury to determine what the inch-perhour rainfall was at a particular time and place. A good jurisdictional illustration is the requirement for diversity jurisdiction that
the amount in controversy exceed $75,000.77 Courts have struggled
to determine how non-monetary relief is valued in that threshold
amount,78 and it often cannot be predicted clearly whether a suit
seeking primarily injunctive relief will satisfy this rule. Another jurisdictional example is the CAFA requirement that a district court
decline jurisdiction if greater than two-thirds of the proposed class
members are citizens of the state in which the action was originally
filed,79 a calculation that could be extremely difficult if the class
members are numerous and largely unknown. In other words, as
the facts prescribed by the rule become numerous or difficult to ascertain or apply, the rule becomes less clear.80
By contrast, the standard “drive at a safe speed” could be far
clearer, particularly if all actors have similar baseline assumptions
about what that standard means for the situation at hand and if the
75

Schuck, supra note 73, at 5–6.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006). One court described CAFA as an “opaque, baroque
maze of interlocking cross-references.” Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1198
(11th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part by Pretka v. Kolter City Plaza II, 608 F.3d 744, 747
(11th Cir. 2010).
77
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
78
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.3 (5th ed. 2007).
79
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006).
80
See Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal Stud. 257, 261 (1974) (arguing that clarity and determinacy can be
gauged from the number and simplicity of the facts to which legal consequences attach).
76
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facts necessary to prove those assumptions are readily ascertainable. We all know, for instance, that driving 100 miles per hour in
slick conditions at night on a curvy road is not “safe.” As Justice
Scalia has admitted, even the famous “reasonableness” standard
from torts can, at the margins, become an issue of law that is just as
clear as any rule purports to be.81 For the same reasons, at least one
commentator has argued that the standard for statutory “arising
under” jurisdiction as elaborated in Grable & Sons Metal Products
v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing82 is relatively clear and predictable to apply.83
Things are complicated further by the interpretive process,
which tends to move both rules and standards to a middle ground.
As Pierre Schlag has argued, rules tend to become less clear as
courts generate exceptions, define terms with resort to underlying
policies, and give case-specific explanations.84 “[N]o law” in the
First Amendment85 does not actually mean “no law” but instead
means a standard of policies that must be balanced.86 Similarly,
standards tend to become clearer as limits are established by specific application and as clearer summaries are substituted for complex or uncertain elements.87 Negligence per se is a good example
of the clarifying effect of the “reasonableness” standard in particular application. For jurisdictional illustrations, the appellate-

81
Scalia, supra note 21, at 1181. For a classic statement of this principle, see Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 113 (Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press
2009) (1881) (“A judge who has long sat at nisi prius ought gradually to acquire a
fund of experience which enables him to represent the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an average jury.”).
82
545 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2005).
83
Freer, supra note 53, at 343 (“Grable does not countenance an indeterminate ad
hoc jurisprudence. Rather, it seems likely that cases will fall into rather discernible
categories. . . . Rather than throwing the centrality assessment into chaos, the standard set forth in Grable seems workable and appropriate.”).
84
Schlag, supra note 56, at 429.
85
U.S. Const. amend. I.
86
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494, 521 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]here
are those who find in the Constitution a wholly unfettered right of expression. . . . The
historic antecedents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was
to give unqualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the
range of political interest.”).
87
Schlag, supra note 56, at 429.
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jurisdiction rules requiring a “final” judgment or decision88 have
been interpreted to have several uncertain exceptions and applications,89 while the statutory “arising under” standard for federalquestion jurisdiction has been interpreted to be covered by the
clearer well-pleaded complaint rule.90
As I explain in Part III, things get far more complicated than
even this in matters of federal jurisdiction. Suffice it to say for now
that clarity is different than rulism. Rules do generally tend to be
clearer and simpler than standards, but that is not always the case.
As a result, although the rules versus standards debate is informative, jurisdictional clarity must be unpacked on its own terms.
B. Mandates and Discretion
Before getting to that, though, there is another debate that must
be discussed: mandates versus discretion. It is important not only
because it touches upon issues of clarity but also because it has
moved full-tilt to the area of federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
The mandate versus discretion dichotomy has two different applications. The first is in the facts. How much discretion does a
judge have to consider and weigh available facts? This application
merges with the rules versus standards dichotomy discussed
above,91 and, as I demonstrated there, jurisdictional clarity is distinct from it.
The second application is in the law, where the debate has distinguished itself from the rules versus standards debate and has
moved prominently into the arena of federal jurisdiction. The
questions are these: Does or should a federal court have discretion
(and, if so, how much) to determine the boundaries of its jurisdiction, and whether to decline to exercise it? Some cases are easier
than others. For example, Congress expressly gave federal courts
88

28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 485–86 (1975) (listing exceptions);
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949) (characterizing certain interlocutory orders as “final”); see also David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 565–66 (1985) (“The word ‘final’ has an authoritative
and crisp ring to it, but questions arise in its application. . . . [E]ven words that appear
sharp turn out, on close examination, to be fuzzy around the edges.”).
90
For a detailed discussion of the history of the Court’s interpretation of the statutory language, see Freer, supra note 53, at 311–17.
91
See supra text accompanying notes 61–64.
89
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discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if compelling reasons exist.92 Similarly, Congress expressly gave federal
courts discretion to decline to exercise CAFA diversity jurisdiction
over certain class actions in the interest of justice and under the totality of the circumstances.93 But there is a vigorous and ongoing
debate about the propriety of judicial discretion in matters of federal jurisdiction when Congress has not been so explicit.
That debate prominently features the respective work of Martin
Redish and David Shapiro.94 Redish, on the one hand, has argued
that judicially created abstention doctrines and judicially created
exceptions to congressional grants of jurisdiction constitute illegitimate judicial lawmaking and make for bad policy.95 Shapiro, on
92

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006).
Id. § 1332(d)(3) (2006).
94
By highlighting Redish and Shapiro, I do not mean to suggest that this is an exclusive dialogue; other prominent voices have made important contributions to the conversation. See, e.g., Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 1207, 1256–74 (2001) (exploring the historical legitimacy of judicial discretion to
shape jurisdiction); Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court,
Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 48–49 (1990) (arguing that
the boundaries of federal jurisdiction and the authority to define it evolve through a
dialogue between Congress and the courts); Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1892–95 (generally agreeing with Shapiro but charting a more middle-of-the-road approach); Gene
R. Shreve, Pragmatism Without Politics—A Half Measure of Authority for Jurisdictional Common Law, 1991 BYU L. Rev. 767, 788–89 (arguing that courts can help
shape jurisdictional contours for judicial administration reasons); Nash, supra note 49,
at 46 (arguing that jurisdictional grants should be rule-based and unsusceptible to discretion and that abstention doctrines should be discretionary based on standards). I
hasten to add that the debate widens as the constitutional limits on congressional control of jurisdiction are considered. For a sampling of that related discussion, compare,
for example, Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to
Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 143,
145 (1982) (arguing that Congress has extremely broad power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts), and William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte
McCardle, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 229, 260 (1973) (same), with, for example, Akhil Reed
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 205, 243 (1985) (arguing that federal courts have some jurisdiction that cannot be removed by Congress), and Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 Harv. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2011)
(arguing that bicameralism and presentment requirements limit Congress’s power).
95
See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of
the Judicial Function, 94 Yale L.J. 71, 105–14 (1984) (arguing for little to no judicial
authority over jurisdictional doctrine). To be clear, Redish’s work challenges federalcourt discretion to decline jurisdiction despite a lack of congressional authorization to
do so. He does not challenge (at least not on institutional lawlessness grounds) federal-court discretion to decline jurisdiction when authorized by Congress.
93
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the other hand, has argued that federal courts should exercise discretion both to define jurisdictional boundaries and to decline to
exercise jurisdiction that is admittedly conferred.96 He argues that
such judicial discretion is “desirable in giving room for flexibility,
fine-tuning, recognition of difference, and accommodation of unforeseen developments,”97 and that courts are better at drawing accurate jurisdictional lines than Congress.98 He also suggests that judicial discretion is legitimate because the statutory language that
Congress uses to draw jurisdictional boundaries is often (and is intended to be) discretion conferring.99
The mandate versus discretion debate is relevant to jurisdictional clarity because both implicate questions of judicial legitimacy, lawful authority, hierarchical order, institutional capacity,
and inter-branch conversations. In addition, it seems to be true that
broad judicial discretion tends to lead to complex and unclear doctrine.100 But these implications are mainly orthogonal to jurisdictional clarity. The mandate versus discretion debate is directed
primarily at the singular institutional question of which branch
(Congress or the courts) is lawfully authorized or normatively superior for drawing jurisdictional boundaries. That question is quite
different from—though not entirely unrelated to—the question
whether those boundaries are clear and simple.
That difference is emphasized by the fact that a discretionary
doctrine may be clear,101 while a mandate may not. The congressional authorization for courts to exercise discretion to retain or
decline supplemental jurisdiction, for example, is guided by some
relatively clear factors, including when the state claim substantially
predominates over the original-jurisdiction claims and when the
96
Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574–79; see also David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to “Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 Va.
L. Rev. 1839, 1844–46 (1992) (amplifying the argument).
97
Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841.
98
Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574.
99
David L. Shapiro, Foreword: A Cave Drawing for the Ages, 112 Harv. L. Rev.
1834, 1843 (1999).
100
Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1904; Schuck, supra note 73, at 10–11.
101
Indeed, those who argue in favor of discretion and standards tend to argue that
the vaguest and most complicated balancing test will tend to become clear over time
by the simple process of precedent-building. See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 546–47,
589; see also Kaplow, supra note 56, at 577–79 (acknowledging the argument).
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district court has dismissed all of the original-jurisdiction claims.102
By contrast, Article III standing is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite, but its requirements are uncertain in application and unpredictable in result.103 Similarly, the Burford v. Sun Oil Co. and
Younger v. Harris abstention doctrines are mandatory,104 but they
have been maligned as unclear and uncertain.105 In short, whether a
jurisdictional norm is mandatory or discretionary is separate from
whether it is clear and simple.
III. COMPLEXITIES OF CLARITY
Because neither the rules versus standards nor the mandate versus discretion discourse captures it, jurisdictional clarity needs its
own conversation. To date, however, such a separate discourse has
consisted entirely of the thoughtless mantra that jurisdictional rules
should be clear and simple. As a result, jurisdictional clarity is severely underexplored.
This Part takes up that challenge by tackling several complicating facets of jurisdictional clarity: design difficulties, obscurities of
interpretation and application, and the multi-functionality of clarity. Each of these, I argue, adds layers of uncertainty and intricacy
to the otherwise naïve ideal that jurisdictional rules can be clear
and simple.
A. Design Difficulties
Cass Sunstein has stated, “The first problem with rules is that it
can be very hard to design good ones.”106 The same is true for designing clear jurisdictional doctrine. There are at least four reasons.
First, competing policies underlying jurisdiction make clear contours problematic. Second, suboptimal institutional capacities
102

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006).
See Field, supra note 6, at 709–10; Fletcher, supra note 48, at 221 & n.4 (arguing
that standing doctrine is incoherent because the requirements are difficult to apply).
104
See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 361
(1989) (stating that federal courts “must” abstain under the circumstances identified
in Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), and its progeny); Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971).
105
Field, supra note 6, at 696 n.60, 720. But see Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1902–03
(expressing more sympathy for Younger).
106
Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992.
103
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hamper the promulgation of clear jurisdictional rules. Third, disparate perceptions of target actors—those observing the effects of the
jurisdictional rules—create tensions that are difficult to resolve.
Fourth, even when clear jurisdictional rules are possible, the choice
between viable options can be uncertain and difficult. Each design
difficulty clouds the ideal of a clear and simple jurisdictional doctrine.
1. Competing Jurisdictional Policies
An inescapable feature of jurisdictional clarity is the complex
character of subject-matter jurisdiction. Subject-matter jurisdiction
comes in many shapes and sizes, including standing, various types
of original jurisdiction, and appellate jurisdiction. Within the various types of original jurisdiction are federal “arising under” jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, removal jurisdiction, supplemental
jurisdiction, admiralty jurisdiction, bankruptcy jurisdiction, and individual jurisdiction-conferring statutes. There are constitutional
and statutory grants. There are constitutional, statutory, and common law limits, such as immunity, abstention, deadlines, and preconditions.
These myriad forms of jurisdiction are tied to the differing—and
sometimes conflicting—goals that jurisdiction promotes. Jurisdictional lines usually are based upon the need for the protection of
federal rights and interests, comity and federalism, judicial resources and docket control, and uniformity.107 Thus, for example,
diversity jurisdiction is largely viewed as necessary to provide a
neutral federal forum to adjudicate interstate conflicts.108 Federal-

107

See Friedman, supra note 12, at 550–54.
See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); cf.
Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483,
496–97 (1928) (arguing that a principal basis was to “protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors”); Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The
Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 997, 1049–
52 (2007) (recounting the belief of some Framers that diversity jurisdiction would
check the “unrestrained majoritarianism” of state juries). Modern justifications include preventing bias against out-of-state litigants, the desire to have federal courts
contribute to the development of state law, the desire to alleviate overburdening state
court dockets, and the availability of a forum that is perceived to be of a higher quality for the dispensation of justice. Redish, supra note 24, at 1800. But see Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for
108
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question jurisdiction is needed to commit important federal rights
and interests to the experience and solicitude of the federal
courts.109 Standing and supplemental jurisdiction promote litigation
efficiency. At the same time, limitations and discretionary declinations of jurisdiction often protect state interests and scarce federal
judicial resources. Jurisdiction also helps demarcate boundaries of
institutional authority among law-speaking organs: Original, appellate, and removal jurisdiction separate federal-court authority from
state-court authority; federal appellate jurisdiction separates trialcourt authority from appellate-court authority; and justiciability
and statutory limits separate judicial authority from political or
agency authority.110
These divergent policies and goals are difficult to unite under
one overarching, clear jurisdictional rule because they are often in
tension with each other. As an easy example, the tension between
separation-of-powers and federalism values often plays out in jurisdictional doctrine. A clear jurisdictional grant might make it easier for a court to adhere to the will of Congress and thus promote
separation-of-powers values.111 But it might also tread on the prerogative of states if the congressional grant is overbroad. The
courts have long exercised authority to decline jurisdiction in those
contexts out of concern for federalism.112 But this practice then runs
up against the criticism that such declination is unlawful, violates
separation of powers, and creates too much discretion.113
Things get much more complicated when the other jurisdictional
values get added into the mix. Consider federal “arising under” ju-

Further Reforms, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 969–84 (1979) (pointing out significant benefits from abolishing general state-citizen diversity jurisdiction).
109
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005).
110
Lees, supra note 8, at 1478–86.
111
See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”); Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment) (“Vague and obscure rules may permit judicial power to reach beyond its constitutional and statutory limits . . . .”).
112
See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 547.
113
See Field, supra note 6, at 718–19; Redish, supra note 24, at 1831. For a novel argument for the concurrent sharing of jurisdiction in such cases, see Barry Friedman,
Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State
Courts, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1211 (2004).
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risdiction, for example. The Holmes test—that the case arises under the law that creates the cause of action—is a relatively clear jurisdictional test that captures the basic policy of ensuring that federal district courts can hear federal claims out of concerns for
accuracy and uniformity.114 But some state causes of action nonetheless raise important federal issues that, for the same reasons,
ought to be heard by federal courts.115 These limitations of the
Holmes test for original, district-court federal-question jurisdiction
lead to a broader and relatively less clear rule for the Supreme
Court’s federal-question appellate jurisdiction.116 And, to control its
own docket, the Supreme Court has interpreted original, districtcourt federal-question jurisdiction to be broader than the Holmes
test, creating more uncertainty at those edges.117
Conversely, because the Holmes test is overinclusive and intrudes upon the very federalism values that animate federal jurisdiction, abstention doctrines on the back end allow an escape hatch
for certain cases. But, because they take the form of policy-laden
exceptions to an imperfect rule, they are themselves generally unclear and complicated inquiries,118 and, because the courts implement them without express authorization from Congress, they are
often criticized as unlawful exercises of judicial lawmaking.
The point is that an attempt to design a relatively clear jurisdictional line in one area for one policy value often leads to such inaccuracies and disconnects with competing policies that correction
quickly follows in the form of express exceptions or fact-specific
application.
114
See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (asserting that most federal questions arise from federal causes of action).
115
See Freer, supra note 53, at 342 (arguing that the Holmes test fails “to ensure a
federal trial forum, with federal expertise, for the sensitive interpretation of federal
law, free from state-court biases”); Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28
U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 Vand. L. Rev. 1667, 1677–82 (2008) (recasting § 1331
jurisdiction as dependent upon either a federal cause of action or a federal right).
116
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975) (creating exceptions
to the finality rule for appellate jurisdiction to broaden opportunities for federal issues to be heard in federal court).
117
Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (“The doctrine captures the commonsense notion that a
federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law . . . .”).
118
See, e.g., Field, supra note 6, at 720 (maligning Younger abstention for these reasons).

DODSON_PRE_PP

2011]

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity

27

2. Institutional Incapacities
In addition to the problem of accommodating the competing jurisdictional policies, the identity of the institution making the rule
has its own troubles for jurisdictional clarity. There are basically
three types of institutional rulemakers: Congress, the courts, or
both in collaboration. As it turns out, each type presents its own
challenges for jurisdictional clarity.119
Congress has a difficult time crafting clear jurisdictional rules for
two basic reasons: a lack of expertise in jurisdictional issues (at
least as compared to the courts) and a lack of political motivation.
Indeed, Congress has largely eschewed attempts to promulgate
clear jurisdictional statutes, instead preferring more flexible language to allow courts to play a role.120 There are pockets of clarity
and specificity, of course,121 but the proportion of major jurisdictional statutes that uses uncertain language and the limited role
that Congress plays once courts have begun interpreting that language122 suggest that Congress, though it has the time and resources
to best attempt to create clear jurisdictional boundaries ex ante, is
uncomfortable and perhaps unmotivated to do so.
Courts also have difficulty, for although they have the expertise,
they lack the time, resources, and institutional structure to craft
clear, ex ante boundaries.123 The Rules Enabling Act does provide
the Supreme Court, through its appointed committees, with that
ability, but most rulemaking under the Rules Enabling Act cannot
be jurisdictional because the Act delegates rulemaking authority
only over matters relating to “practice and procedure.”124 In the
119
I do not take a normative position on which institution should draw jurisdictional
lines, which has been debated at length elsewhere. See supra text accompanying notes
94–99. I explore those roles only from the perspective of their impact on jurisdictional
clarity.
120
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (using the term “arising under”); id. § 1367(a)
(using the term “so related”).
121
See, e.g., id. § 1332(a) (setting a dollar amount-in-controversy limit).
122
For example, by leaving the language of § 1331 unchanged for over 100 years,
Congress has acquiesced in virtually all of the interpretive gloss the Court has placed
on it. See Friedman, supra note 94, at 24 (stating that although “Congress’s intent has
had little . . . to do with” judicial interpretation of § 1331, “Congress generally has let
the Court have its way without interference”).
123
See Scalia, supra note 21, at 1182–83 (explaining these difficulties for courts).
124
28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the rules govern
“procedure”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (asserting that “[t]hese rules do not extend or limit

DODSON_PRE_PP

28

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 97:1

main, then, judicial line-drawing must be done ex post, in the context of a particular case, in the incremental common law fashion of
building upon doctrine.125 That can be a very poor way to develop
jurisdictional doctrine clearly because it often takes a long time to
develop clear and generally applicable tests. It also causes path dependence from stare decisis—it is hard for courts to correct themselves once a jurisdictional line has been drawn, resulting in doctrinal accommodations that are complicated, confusing, and
unclear.126 And courts usually offer reasons for their rules (while
Congress does not),127 inviting uncertainty in specific circumstances
where a clear rule does not fit the articulated policies. Finally,
courts have a weaker claim to constitutional authority in developing jurisdictional boundaries since the Constitution generally
commits to Congress the power to control court jurisdiction.128 As a
result, courts may be wary of drawing clear jurisdictional lines for
fear that such bold strokes will infringe upon Congress’s authority.
Barry Friedman has argued that jurisdictional boundaries are
created by both branches through a dialogic process.129 Assuming
Congress and the courts do not have fundamental disagreements

the jurisdiction of the district courts”). There is an exception allowing rules to define
what is “final” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction under § 1291. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(c)
(2006). The Supreme Court has made clear that it prefers the formal rulemaking
process to the development of rules in the context of a particular case. See Mohawk
Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009).
125
See Redish, supra note 24, at 1769 (arguing that most modern jurisdictional doctrines have evolved incrementally rather than being promulgated in detail all at once).
126
Stare decisis arguably has less force in matters of federal jurisdiction as opposed
to matters involving primary actors. See id. at 1770 n.6 (“Stare decisis may be especially important when legal issues directly affect the planning of primary social or
economic behavior.”). But lax stare decisis in jurisdictional doctrine creates more uncertainty and instability because of the greater likelihood of an abrupt change of direction.
127
There are exceptions. As Fred Schauer has noted, courts decide some cases without giving reasons, such as jury verdicts, trial-judge rulings on objections, and the denial of certiorari. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 633, 637 (1995).
These are unlikely to come up often in the jurisdictional context. In addition, Congress occasionally codifies its reasons in bills. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2 § 2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–5 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.).
128
See U.S. Const. art III, § 1.
129
Friedman, supra note 94, at 48–49.

DODSON_PRE_PP

2011]

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity

29

about how to draw the jurisdictional lines,130 such a process seems
to have the best of both worlds: Congress’s capacity for ex ante
rules coupled with the judiciary’s experience with jurisdiction. In
practice, though, the dialogue often is quite limited and, as a result,
does not appear to improve jurisdictional clarity. As discussed
above, Congress usually promulgates jurisdictional statutes with
open-ended terms and lets the courts interpret them as they see
fit.131 Such a process is less a dialogue than a delegation. Similarly,
when the courts take the lead, Congress often responds merely by
codifying existing doctrine rather than improving jurisdictional
clarity.132 As much could be said about the supplementaljurisdiction statute, which few have argued is clearer or simpler
than the pre-existing doctrine.133 The use of clear statement rules in
jurisdictional doctrine has generated some promising results, but
that has its own complications, which I discuss in more detail below.134 In sum, each institution’s inadequacies make clear rulemaking complicated.

130

This assumption is not universally shared. See, e.g., id. at 27–28 (arguing that the
courts have long tried to narrow diversity jurisdiction, while Congress has repeatedly
chosen to retain it).
131
See text accompanying supra notes 120–22. A rare counterexample is the recent
back-and-forth between the Court and Congress over the scope of habeas corpus for
executive detainees. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733–36 (2008).
132
There are a few counter examples. The courts haphazardly defined corporate citizenship for diversity-jurisdiction purposes until Congress stepped in to define it more
clearly. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2006) (defining corporate citizenship); Field, supra
note 6, at 694 (discussing the doctrinal development).
133
See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545 U.S. 546, 572 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (calling the statute “opaque”); Redish, supra note 24, at 1822 (arguing that
the “so related” test “is plagued by a good deal of circularity and question-begging”);
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et al., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 Emory L.J. 943, 961 (1991) (defending the statute but conceding that “codifying a complex area like supplemental jurisdiction . . . is itself complex business” and that “[t]he statute is concededly not
perfect”); Symposium, A Reappraisal of the Supplemental-Jurisdiction Statute: Title
28 U.S.C. § 1367, 74 Ind. L.J. 1 (1998) (exploring doctrinal and practical intricacies of
the supplemental-jurisdiction statute). But see Nash, supra note 49, at 24–25 (arguing
that supplemental jurisdiction is fairly clear).
134
See infra text accompanying notes 164–80.
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3. Disparate Perceptions of Target Actors
The design difficulty is further clouded by the rarely acknowledged question inherent in the mantra favoring “clear and simple”
jurisdictional rules: “Clear and simple to whom?”
One might answer that question by asserting that jurisdictional
clarity should be targeted to lawyers and judges. Federal jurisdiction, after all, is seen as “law for lawyers” because it concerns the
intricate navigation of the federal-court system as opposed to the
regulation of primary lay conduct.135 This makes some sense: the
cost savings and legitimacy enhancements produced by jurisdictional clarity primarily benefit litigants (through the exercised
judgment of their lawyers) and judges.136 But there is another important observer, and that is the lay public. Commentators usually
marginalize the effect of jurisdictional clarity on the lay observer,137
but I believe the effect creates three significant but overlooked divides that complicate the development of clear and simple jurisdictional doctrine.
The first is one of motivation. Although secondary legal actors
do benefit from clear jurisdictional doctrine, they also may have
powerful incentives to undermine that clarity. Lawyers, for example, might favor complicated doctrine to ensure a continued need
for representation and might also favor uncertain doctrine to allow
for maximum flexibility in argument for a preferred forum.138
Judges may resist clarifying developments to allow for greater exercise of judicial power, to be able to write scholarly opinions, to
clear dockets through nimble use of a flexible jurisdictional doc135

Little, supra note 32, at 76.
See supra text accompanying notes 15–24.
137
See, e.g., Little, supra note 32, at 78. There are some exceptions for jurisdictional
doctrines, such as patent or admiralty jurisdiction, that have an impact on a specialized group of lay primary actors. See, e.g., Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 553 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Such a test
also introduces undesirable uncertainty into the affairs of private actors—even those
involved in common maritime activities—who cannot predict whether or not their
conduct may justify the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction.”). In addition, jurisdictional
statutes can be packaged in a way that is more appealing to laity, such as the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4–14 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), which was pitched by some as tort reform. See, e.g.,
151 Cong. Rec. S1234–35, 1241–42 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statements of Sens. Sessions and Voinovich).
138
See Schuck, supra note 73, at 26, 32.
136
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trine, or to promote more subtle substantive agendas in disguise.139
I do not mean to imply that these incentives will carry the day; I
just mean to characterize as an oversimplification the idea that the
legal community has a strong and uniform incentive to clarify jurisdictional doctrine. The lay public, by contrast, has a far less complicated incentive structure.
The second divide is in the degree of clarity needed. Lawyers
and judges, because of their expertise and experience in law and
jurisdiction, can understand doctrine at a level of complexity and
uncertainty that lay persons cannot. A lay person may read the “so
related” language of the supplemental-jurisdiction statute140 and
have no understanding at all of its meaning, while a seasoned lawyer can identify, with relative precision, what claims will meet that
standard and what claims will not. In other words, what is clear to
one observer may be unclear to another, and both observers are
important in the context of doctrinal clarity.
The third divide is one in kind. For the lawyers and judges—and
for legal academics and legislators, too—conceptual clarity is important to make sense of the doctrine and to tie it to broader
themes and consistencies throughout the law. It is particularly important in jurisdictional contexts, which are designed to promote
systemic non-litigant values. It makes sense to them to wrangle
over the clarity of supplemental jurisdiction or abstention doctrines
and whether the level of clarity in those doctrines is consistent with
notions of judicial power or federalism values. But to the extent
these individuals advocate for clear and simple jurisdictional doctrine for those reasons, they likely promote doctrinal clarity in the
abstract.
But there is another form of doctrinal clarity, one that focuses on
results visible to lay observers: the operational clarity of the doctrine. As Justice Scalia has noted, “When a case is accorded a different disposition from an earlier one, it is important, if the system
of justice is to be respected, not only that the later case be different, but that it be seen to be so.”141 In other words, it is not enough
139

See id. at 26, 33–34 (discussing these incentives in the context of substantive law).
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
141
Scalia, supra note 21, at 1178. On a related note, Justice Scalia has stated that it is
“[m]uch better, even at the expense of the mild substantive distortion that any generalization introduces, to have a clear, previously enunciated rule that one can point to
140
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that jurisdictional doctrine be clear; it also must clearly explain the
differences in results to interested lay observers. Lay observers
could not care less that the test for federal-question jurisdiction, in
the abstract, might “resemble[] more the free-standing, subjective,
and individualized determinations of Judge Wapner than a coherent, generalizable jurisdictional doctrine.”142 They care about consistent, fair, and sensible results (and perhaps even think that
Judge Wapner does a fair job of achieving that!). To be sure, clear
doctrine might lead to clear results much of the time. But that is
not always the case, and the Court has had occasion to choose between an abstract doctrinal clarity that might make sense to lawyers and judges and an operational clarity in results that would
make better sense to lay observers.
For example, in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., the Court
held that a merits determination began running the time to appeal
even though a motion for attorney’s fees was still pending, and
even though the law authorizing attorney’s fees treated them as
part of the merits judgment.143 The Court explained:
This practical approach to the matter suggests that what is of importance here is not preservation of conceptual consistency in
the status of a particular fee authorization as “merits” or “nonmerits,” but rather preservation of operational consistency and
predictability in the overall application of § 1291. This requires,
we think, a uniform rule that an unresolved issue of attorney’s
fees for the litigation in question does not prevent judgment on
144
the merits from being final.

Budinich thus favors predictability in results (what the Court
termed “operational consistency and predictability”) over doctrinal
predictability (what the Court termed “conceptual consistency”).145

in explanation of the decision.” Id.; see also Frank I. Michelman, Relative Constraint
and Public Reason: What is “The Work We Expect of Law”?, 67 Brook. L. Rev. 963,
966 (2002) (arguing that decisionmakers should have several goals in mind: to resolve
disputes, to establish predictable and stable legal doctrine, and to promote morally
appropriate and justified outcomes).
142
Redish, supra note 24, at 1794.
143
486 U.S. 196, 199–01 (1988).
144
Id. at 202.
145
See id.
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Similarly, in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, a
lower court entered a preliminary injunction based only upon a
“high likelihood of success” on the merits of the claim that a federal statute was unconstitutional.146 The Supreme Court then considered whether that preliminary injunction was a “holding” of unconstitutionality within the meaning of Section 1252, which grants
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over certain federal orders
“holding an Act of Congress unconstitutional.”147 The Court answered in the affirmative and stated that “it should make little difference whether the court stated conclusively that a statute was unconstitutional, or merely said it was likely, so long as the injunction
granted enjoined the statute’s operation. This Court’s appellate jurisdiction does not turn on such semantic niceties.”148 Thus, the
Walters Court emphasized the clarity of the results of the application of the rule rather than the clarity of the legal rule’s terms—in
effect, results over doctrine.
These examples from appellate jurisdiction reflect the divide between doctrine and results even when the difference in results is
merely a difference in the available forum. In other words, regardless of the consistency of the results of appellate-jurisdiction doctrine, there is still an available forum (that is, district court) for litigation of the merits. It seems likely that other areas of jurisdiction,
such as the jurisdictionality of statutory preconditions, could reflect
the same divide in a way that resonates even more strongly with
the lay public because the difference in result may be the difference between an available forum and no forum at all.149 The difference between a jurisdictional statute of limitations in the Tucker
Act for claims against the federal government and a nonjurisdictional limitations period in Title VII perhaps can be explained doctrinally by a commitment to stare decisis,150 but the lay person who
sees a late Title VII claim heard on the merits but a late Tucker

146

473 U.S. 305, 316 (1985).
Id. at 316–18 (quoting and discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1252).
Id. at 317.
149
I thank Howard Wasserman for raising this point.
150
Compare John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–36
(2008) (typing the Tucker Act period as a “more absolute” and unwaivable bar), with
Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) (typing the Title VII period as
a nonjurisdictional and waivable limit).
147
148
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Act claim forever barred may find that rationale very difficult to
swallow in light of the disconnect in the results.
The rub of all of this is that the promotion of jurisdictional doctrinal clarity has its own complications because the potential targets of that clarity have different motivations, perceptions, and interests. These differences can create tensions between observers.
The difficulty of reconciling those tensions clouds attempts to develop clear and simple jurisdictional doctrine.
4. Choosing Between Clarities
One could ignore or treat cavalierly these formation complexities, but doing so does not make the formulation process easy, for
the rulemaker must still choose a particular clear jurisdictional
boundary. That choice implicates the difficult question of where to
set the boundary, a question that entails consideration of all of the
jurisdictional goals and policies. In a nutshell, jurisdictional clarity
and simplicity do not avoid the need to address these complex considerations. Three examples illustrate why that is the case.
a. The Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
The scope of the constitutional “arising under” grant151 was established in 1824, when the Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of
the United States held that any federal “ingredient” of the original
cause gave rise to federal jurisdiction.152 When the statutory grant
was passed fifty-one years later in 1875 with language nearly identical to the constitutional grant,153 it would have been perfectly reasonable for clarity purposes for the Supreme Court to have interpreted the scope of the statutory grant identically to the scope of
the constitutional grant.154 Instead, the Court imposed the wellpleaded complaint rule,155 which the Court views as narrower than
151

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
153
Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137 § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (1875) (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)).
154
The Court in fact did so initially. See Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason
for It; It’s Just our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 Hastings L.J. 597, 603–04 (1987) (detailing
the history); Freer, supra note 53, at 313–17 (providing a similar discussion).
155
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).
152
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the Osborn interpretation of the constitutional grant.156 The wellpleaded complaint rule is, at best, a modest improvement in clarity;
both tests demarcate the jurisdictional boundary in relatively clear
fashion. The real import of the well-pleaded complaint rule is that
it purports to shift that boundary to restrict federal-question jurisdiction.157 The statutory choice thus is not between a clear jurisdictional boundary and an unclear one, but between two (or among
more) relatively clear jurisdictional boundaries that differ in scope.
Making such a choice is not easy; it involves a difficult balancing
of the need for federal jurisdiction over important questions of
federal law, the need to control federal dockets, the accurate interpretation of the scope of federal judicial power, and the vindication
of party preference. A recent illustration of this complex balancing
is Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, in which the
Supreme Court considered whether to apply the well-pleaded
complaint rule to the Federal Circuit’s patent jurisdiction.158 The
Court did apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, in part because a
contrary rule would broaden federal jurisdiction to the detriment
of state-court competence and authority.159 Justice Stevens concurred but noted the strong countervailing need for uniformity in
federal patent law.160 Others have noted additional relevant considerations, including a potential “pro-patent bias” in the Federal Cir-

156

See City of Chi. v. Coll. of Int’l Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 184 (1997) (stating that
cases “within the meaning of § 1331 compose a collection smaller than the one fitting
within the similarly worded Clause in Article III”). I note that there is some disagreement about the breadth of the Osborn rule, with some commentators taking an
expansive view, see, e.g., John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the
Litigative Unit: When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 1829,
1832–33 (1998), and others taking a narrower view, see, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 807–09 (2004). I assume for the
illustrative purposes in this Article that the well-pleaded complaint rule is, as the
Court seems to view it, a narrower grant of jurisdiction than Article III’s “arising under” grant.
157
William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 890, 891 (1967) (explaining that interpreting the statutory grant co-extensively with Osborn would have been impractical
because “arising under” cases would have flooded the federal courts).
158
535 U.S. 826, 827 (2002).
159
Id. at 832.
160
Id. at 838 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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cuit,161 the need to respect the parties’ choice of forum,162 and the effect on federal dockets.163 The point is not that the Supreme Court
got it wrong in adopting the well-pleaded complaint rule in the
patent context or even in Mottley; rather, the point is that the
adoption of the relatively clear rule could not escape the complex
and uncertain policy questions that underlie jurisdictional linedrawing.
b. Jurisdictional Characterization
It can be difficult to determine whether a particular statutory
limitation on a claim—such as a limitations period, a suit prerequisite, or a statutory coverage condition—is jurisdictional or not.164
To inject clarity into these jurisdictional characterization questions,
the Court recently has implemented a clear statement rule and presumption. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. considered whether the employer-numerosity requirement of Title VII—the statutory coverage condition that an employer have at least fifteen employees—
was a jurisdictional requirement or a forfeitable element of the
claim.165 The Court acknowledged that Congress could have made
the employer-numerosity requirement jurisdictional, but it stated
that it would presume that such a statutory coverage requirement
was not jurisdictional unless Congress clearly demarcated it as
such.166 Similarly, in Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, one of the jurisdictional cases from last Term, the Court followed the Arbaugh
presumption to hold that the registration requirement in Sec-

161

Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 25–30, 54 (1989).
162
See Field, supra note 6, at 722 (“Simplification of much jurisdictional doctrine
would result from generally espousing the position that, where Congress has given
concurrent jurisdiction, the federal courts should respect the parties’ choice of forum.”).
163
Justice Brennan has made this point in a different line-drawing case. See Walters
v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 349 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is simply too burdensome for this Court to bear mandatory direct jurisdiction
over every preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and other pretrial order in cases potentially implicating the constitutionality of federal statutes.”).
164
See Dodson, supra note 13, at 56.
165
546 U.S. 500, 503 (2006) (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)).
166
Id. at 514–16.
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tion 411(a) of the Copyright Act was a waivable precondition
rather than a jurisdictional requirement.167
Clear statement rules and presumptions are useful doctrinal
clarification devices. They help guide lower courts in their interpretation of jurisdictional characterization questions, give instructions
to Congress on how to ensure that boundaries are properly typed
jurisdictional, and make it clearer to litigants what is jurisdictional
and what is not. And, as I explain in more detail later in this Article, they can facilitate the smooth coordination of different lawspeaking institutions.168 For these reasons, I elsewhere have supported the use of clear statement presumptions in characterizing
the jurisdictionality of removal provisions.169
But we ought not to overvalue these clarity-facilitating features
of clear statement rules and presumptions, for they raise their own
uncertainties. What kind of a clear statement overcomes the presumption?170 Arbaugh explained that a sufficient clear statement
would “speak in jurisdictional terms or refer . . . to the jurisdiction
of the district courts,”171 but the test cannot be as simple as that, for
the Court has held jurisdictional a limit that does not refer to jurisdiction,172 has held nonjurisdictional a limit that does refer to jurisdiction,173 and has waffled on a different limit referring to jurisdiction—calling it “more absolute” instead of “jurisdictional.”174 A
similar problem arises in other jurisdictional clear statement rules,
namely Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction.175 That the Supreme
Court decided four cases just this past Term involving jurisdictional

167

130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241, 1244–45 (2010) (discussing 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)).
See infra text accompanying notes 232–35.
169
See Dodson, supra note 13, at 66–71.
170
This is a common problem of clear statement rules. See generally William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992) (cataloguing variants of clear
statement rules and the levels of clarity required for each).
171
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (quoting Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385,
394 (1982)).
172
See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 209–11 (2007).
173
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998).
174
See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 135–36 (2008)
(struggling to classify a statute of limitations that includes jurisdictional language).
175
See, e.g., Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1202 (2010) (confronting the question
of how clear a state court decision has to be on whether it relies on an independent
and adequate state ground to preclude Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction).
168
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characterization inquiries suggests that its attempt to clarify jurisdictional characterization issues is succeeding only modestly at
best.176
Further, the use of clear statement rules and presumptions
masks the more complicated question of what direction they
should take. In other words, should the presumption be against, or
in favor of, jurisdiction? Arbaugh and Michigan v. Long imposed
presumptions that broaden federal jurisdiction,177 but they just as
easily could (and perhaps should) have imposed a converse presumption against jurisdiction. Although there might be good reasons to choose one over the other, that choice necessarily entails a
complex, ex ante consideration of underlying reasons and policy
values.178 Arbaugh, for one, did consider the efficiency and economy implications of typing statutory coverage limitations as jurisdictional,179 but it also could (and perhaps should) have considered
implications on federal docket loads, the legitimacy problems of
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries if Congress actually intended the limitation to be jurisdictional, federalism effects, and
the relative merits of jurisdiction-expanding decisions versus jurisdiction-restricting decisions.180 In most cases, a full consideration of
176
See Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2537–39 (2010) (determining that the
ninety-day time limit in 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5) is not jurisdictional); United Student
Aid Funds v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377–78 (2010) (resolving whether various
bankruptcy filing requirements are jurisdictional); Reed Elsevier v. Muchnick, 130 S.
Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) (resolving the jurisdictionality of 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)); Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment,
130 S. Ct. 584, 597 (2009) (holding that the National Railroad Adjustment Board’s
conferencing requirement is nonjurisdictional).
177
See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006) (presuming, absent a
clear statement of jurisdictionality from Congress, that a statutory limitation did not
restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044
(1983) (presuming, absent a clear statement that the state court decision rests upon an
independent and adequate state ground, that the state court decided the issue according to federal law, rendering the decision reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court).
178
For my own attempt to balance these difficult weightings in the removal context,
see Dodson, supra note 13.
179
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 513–14 (adopting the presumption “mindful of the consequences of typing the fifteen-employee threshold a determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction”). For more on the Arbaugh presumption, see Stephen R. Brown, Hearing
Congress’s Jurisdictional Speech: Giving Meaning to the “Clearly-States” Test in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 46 Willamette L. Rev. 33 (2009).
180
See Gil Seinfeld, The Federal Courts as a Franchise: Rethinking the Justifications
for Federal Question Jurisdiction, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 95, 149–58 (2009) (identifying these
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what direction a presumption should take will be complex and uncertain.
c. Immunity Waiver
Although it is questionable whether the state sovereign immunity exemplified by the Eleventh Amendment is a limitation on a
federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,181 the immunity “partakes of the nature of a jurisdictional bar”182 and thus is useful for
illustration. One of the longstanding features of state sovereign
immunity is that the state can waive it.183 But what constitutes
waiver? Because immunity is a question of state sovereignty that
implicates sensitive federalism relations, the Supreme Court has
been reluctant to find immunity waived absent a state’s clear indication of intent to do so,184 a sort of clear statement rule with a presumption in favor of immunity and against federal jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in Lapides v. Board of Regents, the Court held, under the well-worn aegis that “jurisdictional rules should be clear,”
that the state’s voluntary removal of a case from state court to federal court manifested an implicit waiver of state sovereign immunity in federal court.185
The Lapides rule is relatively clear and simple (at least for removal186), but why the Court chose that particular rule as opposed
to another is not. The Court instead could have clarified the presumption against waiver that it previously had articulated by, for
example, making waiver effective only upon a clear statement in a
factors and exploring the benefits of enlarged or contracted federal jurisdiction in
general).
181
See Scott Dodson, Mandatory Rules, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 19–20 (2008) (arguing
that it is not).
182
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
183
See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447–48 (1883).
184
College Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 675–81 (1999).
185
535 U.S. 613, 616, 621 (2002).
186
Even in the context of removal, though, the Lapides rule can be uncertain. For
example, does a state waive immunity if a non-state co-defendant removes the case in
violation of the unanimity requirement for removal and the state fails to move to remand within the thirty-day deadline provided by the removal statute? See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c) (2006) (imposing the thirty-day deadline for remand motions); Chi., Rock
Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247–48 (1900) (imposing the unanimity
requirement).
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written court filing made by the state. Immunity waiver is, after all,
a matter of federal common law,187 and so the Court had a variety
of options in crafting a clear waiver rule. Why it chose the rule that
it did depended upon a number of complicating factors, including
consistency, fairness, and deference to state sovereignty.188
d. Summary
These examples show that even when clear jurisdictional
boundaries can be created, the choice to adopt one over another is
not at all simple or clear. That choice, institutional inadequacies,
and competing jurisdictional policies present substantial obstacles
to the promulgation of clear jurisdictional rules.
B. The Effect of Implementation
The intricacies of clarity do not end with successful promulgation. The interpretation and application processes present their
own challenges, each with its own effects on jurisdictional clarity.
Interpretative gloss may make an otherwise clear and simple rule
anything but. And, even if the rule and its interpretative gloss are
clear, the application could be complicated or uncertain. Obscurity
in these components of implementation can contaminate the whole
doctrine.
1. Complications of Interpretation
Clear jurisdictional rules rarely do perfectly what is asked of
them because the interpretive process creates obscurity. This obscurity can happen when a court interprets a rule by using more
uncertain terminology, applies the rule in an odd factual setting, or
creates exceptions to the rule.189
The finality rules of appellate jurisdiction illustrate these problems of interpretation. Two statutes are in play here: Section 1257,
which limits Supreme Court jurisdiction over state decisions to
cases in which the highest state court rendered a final judgment or

187

Lapides, 535 U.S. at 622–23.
Id. at 622.
189
See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 128 (2d ed. 1994); Schauer, supra note 56,
at 196–206; Sunstein, supra note 56, at 986–89.
188
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decree,190 and Section 1291, which limits the appellate jurisdiction
of courts of appeals to “final decisions” of district courts.191 Both
require a “final” decision, and the Supreme Court has admitted
that that requirement is clear enough: no appellate jurisdiction
when anything in the case still remains to be decided.192 But that is
not how the interpretation of “final” has gone for either statute.
Instead, the Court has recognized a number of exceptions to the
finality requirement of Section 1257.193 If exceptions in and of
themselves were not confusing enough, the Court has crafted extremely complicated and difficult doctrinal tests for them. Thus,
the Court’s finality exceptions include (1) cases in which “the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings preordained,” (2) cases “in which the federal issue, finally decided by
the highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the outcome of future state-court proceedings,”
(3) cases in which “the federal claim has been finally decided, . . . but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be
had, whatever the ultimate outcome of the case,” and (4) cases in
which “the federal issue has been finally decided . . . and where reversal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of
any further litigation on the relevant [claim].”194
Finality under Section 1291 fares no better. The Court has given
that finality requirement a “practical rather than a technical construction,” leading to the characterization of some patently nonfinal judgments as final under the collateral-order doctrine.195 Further, the test for the appealability of nonfinal collateral orders is a
flabby one: whether the order is “collateral to” the merits of a nonfinal action, “too important” to be denied immediate review, and
“too independent” of the underlying claims to require deferral of
appellate review.196 To make matters even worse, the Court has re190

28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (2006).
Id. § 1291.
192
Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945) (stating that
“[c]onsiderations of English usage as well as those of judicial policy” suggest that the
certiorari statute precludes review “where anything further remains to be determined
by a State court, no matter how dissociated from the only federal issue”).
193
Id. at 124.
194
Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 479–83 (1975).
195
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
196
Id.
191
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fused to ameliorate the uncertainty by, for example, revising its interpretative gloss or at least cabining the existing precedent. To the
contrary, the Court has left open the possibility that other nonfinal
decisions might be deemed to be final.197
Congress has acquiesced in the Court’s interpretation of “final”198 and, instead of restoring clarity through statute, has delegated the responsibility for determining what is “final” under Section 1291 to the Court’s rulemaking powers.199 Thus, in addition to
illustrating the complexities of interpretation, the finality rule also
highlights the difficulty of cooperative clear rule creation that I discussed above in the context of institutional capacities. In short, the
interpretation of jurisdictional rules often reduces their level of
clarity and simplicity,200 and sometimes even with the acquiescence
of the institution that designed them in the first place.
2. Complications of Application
Even if a relatively clear and simple jurisdictional rule comes
through the interpretive process unscathed, the application of that
rule can be difficult and uncertain, particularly if the facts are not
easily discovered or understandable. Application difficulties arise
often in jurisdictional rules because such rules are supposed to be
applied early in the litigation, usually before any discovery has

197

See Mohawk Indus. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 (2009) (declining to extend
the collateral-order doctrine in the case at bar but expressing willingness to do so in
the context of a formal rule promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act).
198
Congress has left the relevant language unchanged since 1789, despite the interpretations that the Court has imposed. Compare An Act to Establish the Judicial
Courts of the United States, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84 (1789) (“[F]inal decrees and
judgments in civil actions in a district court . . . may be reexamined, and reversed or
affirmed in a circuit court . . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006) (“The courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States . . . .”).
199
28 U.S.C. § 2072(c) (2006).
200
Cf. Sunstein, supra note 56, at 961 (stating that interpretation of rules necessarily
involves discretion). There are some counterexamples. The statutory language deeming a corporation to be a citizen, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, of the state of its
“principal place of business” was recently interpreted to mean, in most cases, the state
where the corporation’s headquarters is located. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct.
1181, 1185–86 (2010). That interpretation clarifies an ambiguous term in the statute
that had produced some uncertainty in the lower courts.
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changed hands and while facts are still largely unknown.201 To compound this difficulty, the legal tests for jurisdiction have become
more complex, fact-dependent, and fact-intensive.202
As an example, take the amount-in-controversy requirement for
diversity jurisdiction. The diversity statute sets a threshold limit: no
diversity jurisdiction unless the amount in controversy “exceeds . . . $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs . . . .”203 The rule is
fairly clear, and the interpretation of that rule is also fairly clear.
An amount in controversy that is exactly—but not over—$75,000
will be denied diversity jurisdiction.204 The Supreme Court has construed the amount to include non-monetary relief, and that directive is also clear.205 But how does one calculate the value of nonmonetary relief when the threshold is measured in dollars and
cents? There is an open interpretive question of what legal standard should govern the valuation of injunctive relief,206 but my focus is on the deeper application difficulties. Those application difficulties are simplified somewhat by the superimposed legal rule that
the plaintiff’s good-faith claim controls unless it cannot exceed the
threshold to a legal certainty.207 But the question still calls for a factual assessment that is both unpredictable and complicated, particularly when the jurisdictional amount is based on injunctive re201

For an excellent discussion of some of the issues surrounding the factual proof of
jurisdiction, see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Fact, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 973, 984–
99 (2006).
202
S.I. Strong, Jurisdictional Discovery in United States Federal Courts, 67 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 489, 505 (2010).
203
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006).
204
See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Narvaez, 149 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir.
1998) (dismissing a claim for exactly the jurisdictional amount). But see De Aguilar v.
Boeing Co., 47 F.3d 1404, 1408–12 (5th Cir. 1995) (allowing federal diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff alleged less than the threshold amount if (1) the defendant
shows that the actual contested amount exceeds the jurisdictional limit and (2) the
plaintiff is unable to show that “it is certain that he will not be able to recover more”
than alleged).
205
See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347–48 (1977);
Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1934).
206
See Richard D. Freer, Civil Procedure § 4.5 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the plaintiffviewpoint rule, the defendant-viewpoint rule, and the either-party rule); Brittain
Shaw McInnis, Comment, The $75,000 Question: What Is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1013, 1020–24 (1998). The choice between these viewpoint rules implicates the complexities of choice that I discuss above. See supra text
accompanying notes 151–188.
207
See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288–89 (1938).
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lief, other nonmonetary relief, or punitive damages.208 And these
“cases are legion.”209
But even relatively straightforward compensatory money damages can prove difficult to evaluate. In one typical case, for example, a personal injury plaintiff who sustained a broken thumb in an
automobile accident invoked diversity jurisdiction alleging more
than the jurisdictional threshold based primarily on pain and suffering.210 Suspecting that the amount-in-controversy threshold
could not be met, despite the plaintiff’s allegations to the contrary,
the district court held a hearing and examined “an extensive record,” including the plaintiff’s deposition and the testimony of
three doctors who treated the plaintiff.211 That case illustrates the
difficulties of applying even a bright-line rule of a dollar threshold
to complicated, fact-intensive cases.
Similar application difficulties can be found elsewhere. For example, the test for an individual’s citizenship for diversity jurisdiction purposes is that individual’s “domicile,” which may be
changed by establishing a physical presence in a new state and intending to reside there permanently.212 The legal test is simple
enough, but factually determining an individual’s intent to reside
permanently can be complicated. As Richard Freer has colorfully
written, “Most of us do not jump up one day and cry out, ‘I have
formed the intent to make this state my permanent home!’”213
Rather, the issue is nuanced and often disputed, and courts often
look to a variety of factors to resolve it, including voter registration, tax payment, automobile registration, driver’s license registration, home ownership, and location of bank accounts.214 Other doctrines with potentially difficult and uncertain factual application

208

See Armistead M. Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District
Court, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 733, 734, 738 (1925) (noting that the determination of the
amount in controversy can be “quite complex” and singling out injunctive relief as
presenting a particularly difficult inquiry that is likely to yield “inconsistent and confusing” results).
209
Id. at 738.
210
Burns v. Anderson, 502 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1974).
211
Id. at 972. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, and the
Fifth Circuit ultimately affirmed. Id.
212
See Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399 (5th Cir. 1974).
213
Freer, supra note 206, § 4.5.
214
See id.
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problems include CAFA diversity jurisdiction,215 supplemental jurisdiction,216 and the substantiality test for federal-question jurisdiction.217 Each of these demonstrates that difficulties in factual application can undermine the relative clarity of the governing legal
rule.218 Together with the interpretive overlays, the implementation
of even a clear jurisdictional rule can lead to confusion and complexity.
C. Multi-Instrumentalism
Part of the reason for many of these formation and implementation difficulties is that jurisdictional clarity lacks a consistent and
uniform purpose. The mantra seeks clear and simple rules primarily for cost savings and legitimacy gains. But there are different
ways to seek these goals. And jurisdictional clarity has an additional, underemphasized purpose: facilitating institutional relationships. These instrumentalist features can be in tension with each
other.
1. Cost Control
The most emphasized goal of jurisdictional clarity is the conservation of litigant and judicial resources and the enhanced judicial
legitimacy that flows from proper attention to jurisdictional
boundaries. The idea, described in more detail above, is that clear
jurisdictional rules will result in less jurisdictional litigation, easier
resolution of any litigation that does arise, and improved percep-

215
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I) (2006) (requiring the declination of CAFA
diversity jurisdiction if, among other requirements, “greater than two-thirds of the
members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in
which the action was originally filed”).
216
See id. § 1367(c)(2) (allowing declination of jurisdiction if the supplemental claim
“substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
original jurisdiction”).
217
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682–83 (1946); see also Field, supra note 6, at
691–94 (explaining why the substantiality requirement is difficult in application).
218
For what it is worth, the Supreme Court appears to understand this. See Hertz
Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1185–86 (2010) (choosing a test for corporate citizenship under the diversity statute in large part because of “the need for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as possible”).
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tions of courts that do not overstep their jurisdictional boundaries.219
But the instrumentalism is more nuanced than that simple formula. For example, although jurisdictional requirements and merits requirements generally should avoid overlap because jurisdictional issues must be decided up front, while merits issues should
be decided upon a fully developed record,220 there is good reason to
think that overlap is neither unworkable nor costly. Kevin Clermont, for example, has explored ways in which the competing interests of jurisdiction and merits can be accommodated in overlapping inquiries.221 An overlap may even generate cost-saving
advantages, if a quick look at the merits through jurisdictionrelated hearings can induce mutually beneficial settlement or the
narrowing of merits issues. I do not mean to express disagreement
here with the general goal of cost-saving, but I do mean to suggest
that the method of achieving it is neither certain nor fully articulated.
2. Legitimacy Enhancement
Similarly, jurisdictional clarity is said to promote the goal of enhanced judicial legitimacy, but the methods of achieving that goal
are inconsistent. Because overstepping a jurisdictional boundary is
to act unlawfully and call into doubt the propriety of any resulting
judgment,222 federal courts might be tempted to create clarity in ju219

See supra text accompanying notes 15–24. Here, I treat judicial legitimacy as an
instrumental value that flows from jurisdictional clarity, as opposed to a normative
value flowing from a conceptualization of jurisdiction as power. The latter value relies
on a conceptual distinction between jurisdictionality and non-jurisdictionality that has
been forcefully criticized elsewhere. See Lee, supra note 10, at 1613–21.
220
See Holmes Group v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 838 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Requiring assessment of a defendant’s motive in raising a patent counterclaim or the counterclaim’s
relative strength wastes judicial resources by inviting ‘unhappy interactions between
jurisdiction and the merits.’” (quoting Kennedy v. Wright, 851 F.2d 963, 968 (7th Cir.
1988))); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 507–09 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (chastising the majority for its willingness to look at the merits as an influencing factor in appellate jurisdiction); Wasserman, supra note 10, at 1548 (arguing that
there should be no overlap between jurisdiction and merits).
221
Clermont, supra note 201, at 979–80 (proposing a solution for adjudicating factual
disputes that affect both jurisdiction and the merits).
222
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon
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risdictional rules by constructing presumptions or interpretations
against federal jurisdiction.223 In the same vein, because overstepping jurisdictional boundaries can encroach on the prerogatives of
other law-speaking institutions,224 federal courts might be tempted
to decline jurisdiction when other institutions lay greater claim to
the issue. The abstention doctrines are prime examples.225 Finally,
overstepping jurisdictional boundaries transgresses the constitutional commitment of separation of powers, because Congress—
not the judiciary—has the primary authority for granting federal
jurisdiction.226 The idea is that judicial legitimacy is enhanced when
it at least is clear that the court is not overstepping its jurisdictional
authorization.
But underasserting jurisdiction also can erode legitimacy. Courts
that refuse to hear the merits of an important case for questionable
jurisdictional grounds can suffer in the public eye. Some of the Supreme Court’s most famous standing cases are prime examples.227
In addition, the judicial assertion of power to decline jurisdiction in
the face of a clear affirmative congressional grant also erodes judicial legitimacy for some of the same separation-of-powers reasons
that counsel against overstepping congressional boundaries.228 Fifederal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be
neither disregarded nor evaded.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 1615–21 (tying proper jurisdiction to enhanced legitimacy of judgment).
223
For examples, see supra text accompanying notes 151–88 (discussing the wellpleaded complaint rule, clear statement rules and presumptions, and waiver rules for
state sovereign immunity).
224
See Lees, supra note 8, at 1460 (restricting jurisdictionality to rules that “operate[] to shift authority from one law-speaking institution to another”).
225
See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 551.
226
Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004) (“Only Congress may determine a
lower federal court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”).
227
See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17 (2004) (dismissing a constitutional challenge to the Pledge of Allegiance on a novel prudential standing ground); Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1951, 2009 (2005) (suggesting
that the Court’s legitimacy may have suffered from its artful dodge in Newdow); see
also Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of SelfGovernance, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 1371, 1373 (1988) (“[Some commentators] have concluded that the doctrine of standing is either a judicial mask for the exercise of prudence to avoid decisionmaking or a sophisticated manipulation for the sub rosa decision of cases on their merits.”).
228
See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 170, at 598 (arguing that clear statement rules
and interpretive presumptions suffer from countermajoritarian problems); Daniel J.
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nally, underasserting jurisdiction can leave litigants in a suboptimal
forum,229 or perhaps even without a forum at all,230 resulting in an
injustice that can erode legitimacy. For these reasons, underassertion can damage legitimacy values.
Thus, to be true to the goal of enhancing legitimacy, jurisdictional clarity must be double-sided—clear both for exercising and
for declining jurisdiction. Aside from making jurisdictional clarity
doubly difficult, that mode of clarity rubs up against a third, understated goal of jurisdictional clarity.
3. Addressing Institutional Relationships
That third goal is the facilitation of institutional relationships.
Federal appellate jurisdiction involves the functioning of the intrabranch relationship between district and appellate courts. Other jurisdictional grants involve the inter-system relationships between
federal and state courts. Still others involve the inter-branch relationship between federal courts and Congress or executive agencies. Jurisdictional clarity seeks to define the demarcations of these
divisions, and, in the process, promote harmony between them.231
Good fences make good neighbors.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court’s Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 343, 378 (2002)
(describing arguments that judicial lawmaking raises legitimacy concerns on federalism and separation-of-powers grounds); Redish, supra note 95, at 74–75 (arguing that
abstention doctrines are illegitimate usurpations of congressional authority). But see
Fitzgerald, supra note 94, at 1245 (arguing that Article III originally contemplated a
judicial role for establishing and exercising jurisdiction). One might contend that judicial usurpation of jurisdiction is more offensive than judicial declination of jurisdiction
because Congress acquiesces in—and perhaps even silently delegates to the court—a
certain amount of judicial discretion to decline jurisdiction. Cf. Shapiro, supra note
99, at 1843 (suggesting that legislators may expect courts to fine-tune statutory commands through the process of interpretation). There is truth to that contention today,
but it does not explain how the latter practice developed in the first place. For a novel
argument attempting to reconcile some of these problems, see Friedman, supra note
94, at 2–3 (proposing a “dialogic” developmental process).
229
The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to provide a neutral federal forum when
state court bias is likely, but abstention doctrines can funnel such cases back to state
court. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Uneasy Case for Transjurisdictional Adjudication, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1869, 1899–904 (2008).
230
See, e.g., John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34
(2008) (holding the six-year limitations period for suits in the Court of Federal Claims
to be a quasi-jurisdictional limitation sufficient to negate a purported waiver that
would have allowed the suit to proceed).
231
Lees, supra note 8, at 1460.

DODSON_PRE_PP

2011]

2/23/2011 8:47 PM

The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity

49

That functionality, though, runs up against the friction that results if the fences stand in the wrong place. It is not unusual for
Congress to grant expansive federal jurisdiction, even over cases
that might better be resolved by institutional bodies other than the
federal courts.232 Institutional jockeying and disagreements can result.233
Jurisdictional clarity has a role to play in these inter-institutional
conversations. That role usually is manifested through underassertion doctrines such as abstention doctrines, clear statement rules
and presumptions, and jurisdiction-limiting line-drawing.234 The
idea is that self-limitation of jurisdictional prerogative preserves
harmonious relationships by avoiding encroachment into other institutions’ spheres of authority.235 Unfortunately, this institutional
demarcation function of jurisdictional clarity is in tension with the
legitimacy function of jurisdictional clarity, which condemns judicial usurpation or abdication of jurisdictional authority unless itself
authorized by Congress.
IV. THE PRICE OF CLARITY
As I have argued above, difficulties in design, implementation,
and instrumentalism all erode the ideal of clear and simple jurisdictional rules. Nonetheless, the ideal may be attainable if the rulemaker ignores the costs of attaining it. These include the cost of

232

The diversity statute is a prime example. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). The solution might be for Congress just to be clearer with its jurisdictional legislation, but, as
I have argued, that presents its own challenges. See supra text accompanying notes
120–22.
233
In one memorable case wholly within the federal-court system, the Seventh Circuit and Federal Circuit went toe-to-toe over the propriety of the other’s jurisdiction
in a patent case. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 806–07
(1988) (discussing the procedural history and finally resolving the disagreement).
234
See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (“[I]f Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States and the
Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute.’” (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
242 (1985))); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (“In traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear
statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.”).
235
I note that the Court has used presumptions to overassert jurisdiction as well, see
supra note 177, which may exacerbate any inter-institutional tension.
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clarity itself and the opportunity cost of underutilizing the benefits
of uncertainty.236 In this Part, I explore these costs through the lens
of the well-pleaded complaint rule.
A. The Costs of Clarity and Simplicity
The well-pleaded complaint rule is a rare example of a clear and
simple jurisdictional rule that has withstood the complexities and
difficulties that undermine most attempts at jurisdictional clarity.
But, in many ways, it is the exception that proves the rule, for it attains this clarity and simplicity at a substantial cost. That cost manifests itself in three ways.
I have discussed two of those manifestations already. Because
the well-pleaded complaint rule is almost certainly the result of
pragmatic judicial lawmaking for purposes of controlling the federal docket irrespective of the original meaning of the federal
“arising under” statute,237 the well-pleaded complaint rule incurs
the legitimacy costs that I have articulated above.238 And, as discussed above, the well-pleaded complaint rule is an arbitrary line
largely dissociated from the complex undercurrents of policies that
should inform where to set that line.239
Taking those undercurrents into consideration demonstrates the
third cost of the well-pleaded complaint rule: its gross inaccuracy.240
The entire basis for federal “arising under” jurisdiction (and federal jurisdiction in general) is the idea that forum matters. Federal courts are seen as experts in federal law and thus better than
state courts in interpreting federal law with accuracy,241 uniform236
I rely primarily on logic, theory, example, and—when available—empirical evidence to support these claims. Sadly, few empirical studies are available. More empirical testing should be done to bear out my theoretical assessments.
237
See Doernberg, supra note 154, at 603–04; Freer, supra note 53, at 311–17.
238
See supra text accompanying notes 227–28.
239
See supra text accompanying notes 157–63.
240
For more indictments of the well-pleaded complaint rule, see Cohen, supra note
157, at 915; Doernberg, supra note 154, at 598–99 & n.12; Redish, supra note 24, at
1794–95.
241
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312
(2005) (explaining that federal-question jurisdiction would enable such issues to come
before judges with more expertise in federal law); The American Law Institute, Study
of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 164–65 (1969) (“The
federal courts have acquired a considerable expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal question cases were given to the
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ity,242 and appropriate sensitivity to federal interests.243 Empirical
studies have tended to show that a federal forum makes a difference for removed cases,244 and the amount of wrangling over forum
suggests that parties believe in its importance.245
If the essential purpose of federal jurisdiction is to provide a
needed federal forum over disputed issues of federal law, the wellpleaded complaint rule is a poor way of doing so because it is substantially overinclusive and underinclusive.246 Because the wellpleaded complaint rule times the jurisdictional determination before the answer, it allows federal jurisdiction over all cases in which
a federal claim appears on the face of a complaint, even if the federal claim is not in dispute,247 and even when important state claims

state courts.”); Guido Calabresi, Federal and State Courts: Restoring a Workable
Balance, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1293, 1304 (2003) (asserting that state judges “are not experts on federal law and, with great respect to them, they are not good at it”); Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1105–06 (1977) (arguing that
federal courts are more solicitous of federal civil rights than state courts are). But see,
e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 233, 256 (1988) (arguing that the debate over parity between
state and federal courts is unclear and does not lend itself well to empirical testing);
William B. Rubenstein, The Myth of Superiority, 16 Const. Comment. 599, 599–600
(1999) (arguing that “gay litigants seeking to establish and vindicate civil rights have
generally fared better in state courts than they have in federal courts”).
242
See Grable, 545 U.S. at 312 (referring to the “hope of uniformity”); Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–48 (1816); see also Paul J. Mishkin, The
Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 157, 158 (1953) (asserting that federal jurisdiction is key to establishing uniformity of federal law). But see
Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1567, 1639 (2008) (arguing
that uniformity is overrated).
243
See The Federalist No. 80, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (predicting that states would not scrupulously protect federal interests); James
E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 643, 713 n.314 (2004) (describing how the Supreme
Court has relied on perceptions of state-court hostility to federal interests in extending federal jurisdiction interests). But see, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of
Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 275 (1997) (“A doctrine based on the inherent inadequacy of
state forums would run counter to basic principles of federalism.”).
244
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 Cornell
L. Rev. 581, 593–95 (1998) (showing that plaintiff win rates are lower in removed
cases).
245
See Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1905.
246
This is a common failing of rules (as opposed to standards). See Sullivan, supra
note 56, at 58; Sunstein, supra note 56, at 992–93.
247
See Doernberg, supra note 154, at 652–53.
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remain.248 And it shuts out of federal district court questions of federal law that arise only by way of an answer or counterclaim, even
if those questions of federal law are the only disputed issues in the
case.249
In short, the well-pleaded complaint rule’s clarity-enhancing virtues—early and easy determination—are completely dissociated
from the very purpose of federal “arising under” jurisdiction. The
result is a costly misallocation in federal and state judicial resources, with state courts hearing many federal claims and federal
courts hearing many state claims.250
Given the inherent complexities in jurisdictional clarity generally, it seems unlikely that clear and simple jurisdictional rules
could be designed and implemented in other areas without simply
ignoring—as the well-pleaded complaint rule does—those complexities and uncertainties and thus incurring similar costs. The
well-pleaded complaint rule thus aptly illustrates the price of clarity and the sacrifices it entails.
B. The Value of Uncertainty and Complexity
The second cost of clarity is the missed opportunity to reap the
benefits of uncertainty in jurisdictional rules. Many of these benefits have been explored in the debate between mandates and discretion in jurisdictional doctrine, but I will briefly recapitulate
them here.
First, uncertainty can improve accuracy. As with the wellpleaded complaint rule, ex ante clarity and simplicity often lead to
gross misalignment with the underlying jurisdictional policies.251
248

A district court does have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over nondiverse state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006).
249
See Freer, supra note 53, at 318. It is possible that the Supreme Court would ultimately hear such a case on appeal from the state courts. Mottley itself is a famous
example. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467, 472–74 (1911)
(hearing a federal defense on appeal from state court). But such cases are extremely
rare given the Supreme Court’s highly restricted docket.
250
For more on the accuracy costs of federal jurisdiction over state claims, see Jonathan Remy Nash, Examining the Power of Federal Courts to Certify Questions of
State Law, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 1672, 1674 n.3 (2003) (listing examples of erroneous
federal-court interpretations of state law).
251
Cf. Meltzer, supra note 228, at 383–90 (arguing that Congress has not contemplated changes in litigation, federalism, and political structure when enacting many
jurisdictional statutes).
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Uncertainty, however, to the extent it is coupled with judicial discretion, can provide room for “flexibility, fine-tuning, recognition
of difference, and accommodation of unforeseen developments.”252
It can provide opportunities for courts to better implement and accommodate the underlying policies in given circumstances. These
benefits are particularly true for the area of jurisdiction, in which
the courts have a strong claim to expertise.253
Second, uncertainty can hold more interpretative legitimacy.
Congress may have intentionally drafted a vague or ambiguous jurisdictional statute for the very purpose of delegating power to the
courts to fill that ex ante uncertainty with case-specific accommodations of jurisdictional policies.254 The refusal to develop a clear
and simple jurisdictional rule in such instances furthers, rather than
frustrates, congressional intent.
Third, uncertainty can promote stability in doctrine. Flexibility
allows changing circumstances and norms to be accommodated
without disruption or distortion of precedent. The gradual buildup
of precedent may make fundamental reform more difficult in the
long run,255 but it also should make reform less necessary overall
because the doctrine is crafted in small steps over a longer period
of time. Uncertainty can also promote stability in inter-branch relationships. Barry Friedman has argued that uncertainty “tends to
252

Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841.
See Shapiro, supra note 89, at 574 (“[C]ourts are functionally better adapted to
engage in the necessary fine tuning [of jurisdictional rules] than is the legislature.”).
But see Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28
Cardozo L. Rev. 1961, 1963 (2007) (questioning whether district courts can exercise
broad discretion effectively in matters of procedure); Strong, supra note 202, at 558–
61 (discussing some of the problems of excessive judicial discretion in resolving jurisdictional issues).
254
See, e.g., William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist, Statutory Interpretation, the
Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 Ind. L.J. 211, 228 (1983)
(“[S]ection 1331 can be seen as a delegation of law-making power in the procedural
area . . . .”); Shapiro, supra note 99, at 1843 (“[T]he legislature, in the light of centuries of experience, may have come to expect the process of interpretation to comprise
elements of both agency (the court as applier of the legislature’s mandates) and partnership (the court as fine tuner of the legislature’s general, and sometimes overly
general, proscriptions and commands) . . . .”). But see Scalia, supra note 21, at 1183
(arguing that the “reduction of vague congressional commands into rules that are less
than a perfect fit is not a frustration of legislative intent because that is what courts
have traditionally done, and hence what Congress anticipates when it legislates”).
255
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353,
395–404 (1978); Schuck, supra note 73, at 20–21.
253
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make actors more cautious, which in the context of the dialogue
would protect each branch from over-strong assertions of authority, or a failure to back down in the face of contrary views.”256
Fourth, uncertainty can induce greater sensitivity to the judicial
function. In a recent and elegant essay, Seana Shiffrin argued that
clear rules can “spark complacency and automatous behavior,”
while uncertainty can induce salutary moral deliberation.257 She focused primarily on the virtues of uncertainty in the regulation of
primary conduct and the resulting moral deliberation of primary
actors and lay citizens, rather than the relatively amoral deliberation of secondary legal actors over jurisdictional uncertainty, but
her arguments suggest that such jurisdictional deliberation has its
benefits as well. One virtue might be that jurisdictional uncertainty
allows judges to engage the underlying policies, explore them, try
them in different circumstances, discard them when they no longer
make sense, and generally enhance the systemic and dynamic understanding of the law of jurisdiction.
Fifth, and perhaps related to the preceding point, uncertainty
can encourage competition between legal actors that encourages
healthy debate about jurisdiction. This competition is the converse
of the clarity-driven functionality of streamlining inter-branch relationships. The idea here is that different systems work best when
they are engaged with each other over their proper jurisdictional
boundaries, as opposed to staying pacifically on their own side of
the fence. Robert Cover and Alexander Aleinikoff have made this
point powerfully in the context of their vision of “dialectical federalism,” in which they argued that conflict between state and federal
courts can promote an open-ended dialogue about legal norms.258
The same could apply to jurisdictional issues; where clearly defined
rules might stifle thoughtful discussion, competition may stimulate
it.
I do not mean to propose that jurisdictional uncertainty and
complexity will always lead to these benefits or that, even if they
do, they are superior to jurisdictional clarity and simplicity. I mean
256

Friedman, supra note 94, at 56 n.260.
Shiffrin, supra note 56, at 1221, 1223–25.
258
Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035, 1048 (1977). My thanks to Jay Tidmarsh for
pointing out the parallel to dialectical federalism.
257
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instead to argue that jurisdictional uncertainty and complexity
have their own competing virtues—and clarity and simplicity have
their own attendant costs—that ought to be taken into account
when developing jurisdictional doctrine and when evaluating the
disconnect between the mantra of jurisdictional clarity and the
state of jurisdictional uncertainty in existing doctrine.
V. USING CLARITY (AND COMPLEXITY)
In this Part, I consider whether the lessons of clarity’s complexity and uncertainty can be put to good use. I make two observations. The first is to advance an explanation for the divergence between reality and rhetoric noted in Part I: jurisdictional clarity is, in
most cases, neither clear nor simple, and thus is not realistically attainable. The second is to argue that the largely overlooked problems of jurisdictional clarity suggest that we ought not overvalue
the mantra of clarity and simplicity. Instead, the development of
jurisdictional doctrine should strive for ways to harness the virtues
of both jurisdictional clarity and jurisdictional uncertainty to
maximum advantage.
A. Explaining the Gap
The inherent complexity and uncertainty of jurisdictional clarity—from design to implementation—suggest an obvious answer to
the puzzle of why existing jurisdictional doctrine largely fails to
meet the rhetoric of jurisdictional clarity. Clarity is nice in theory
but mostly unattainable in practice. When clarity is attained, such
as in the well-pleaded complaint rule, it so deviates from its underlying purposes as to be of questionable justification.
This Article, then, explains why that existing doctrine does not
reflect an unrelenting commitment to clear jurisdictional rules.
Clear rules simply prove too much, and, despite good intentions of
adhering to them, either rulemakers give up on designing them or
courts erode them through exceptions and interpretations. Complexity and uncertainty have proven irresistible even for the simplest and clearest of jurisdictional rules, including the Holmes test
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providing for federal jurisdiction over federal causes of action259
and the clear “mandatory and jurisdictional” ninety-day deadline
for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.260 In the
end, the nature of jurisdictional clarity is itself inherently one of
nuance, and the resulting embrace of uncertainty is inevitable.
B. Mixing Clarity and Uncertainty
Rather than resisting jurisdictional uncertainty and blindly adhering to the illusion of pure jurisdictional clarity, we should consider how best to accommodate, even harness, jurisdictional uncertainty. Doing so can, perhaps paradoxically, make jurisdictional
clarity a new reality because it need not attempt to accomplish
more than it can.
I should note at the outset that the idea of hybridizing clarity and
uncertainty in crafting legal rules is not new, at least outside of the
area of subject-matter jurisdiction. As just one example, Martin
Redish has argued that the “clear and present danger” First
Amendment test engages a clarity-furthering presumption in favor
of free speech while using less certain standards to gauge when that
presumption is overcome.261
And, recent literature on subject-matter jurisdiction has touted
the role of hybrid jurisdictional rules, though it tends to center on
the rules versus standards debate instead of clarity and uncertainty.
Jonathan Nash, for example, argues that grants of jurisdiction
should be rule-based, while certain limits on those jurisdictional
grants should be standards- or discretion-based.262 Although I believe that the success of his approach depends upon the relative
scope of the grants and abstention powers, and although I question
whether the particular line he draws—between grants and absten259
See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 681–82 (1946) (refusing to allow federal jurisdiction over a wholly meritless federal claim); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S.
505, 513 (1900) (refusing to find jurisdiction when the federal claim consists solely of
an incorporation of state law).
260
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 45–47 (1990) (elaborating on tolling principles).
261
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1159, 1182–83 (1982).
262
Nash, supra note 49, at 10 (“I will argue that rules are more appropriate in establishing the boundaries of statutory jurisdiction, while the place for standards lies in
deciding whether or not to abstain.”).
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tion—is the best, I do think he is right to say that “[i]t is possible, in
this context, to have one’s cake and eat it, too.”263
It is possible, I think, from the vantage point of clarity and uncertainty. In most cases, questions of federal jurisdiction turn out
to be pretty easy.264 There is broad agreement that, for example,
Section 1331 is a jurisdictional provision while Title VII’s prohibition on “discrimination” is not. Similarly, no one disputes that a Title VII claim “arises under” federal law while a garden-variety
state negligence claim does not. And it seems true today that the
difficult cases, those that involve embedded questions of federal
law under Grable, for instance, are the outliers rather than the
usual cases.265 Regardless of whether we pick a clear or an unclear
jurisdictional doctrine to resolve these questions, the doctrine
picked almost certainly will resolve them correctly.
When inaccuracy is less of a risk, clear and simple jurisdictional
rules have substantial cost advantages over uncertain ones because
they are easier to implement. For the easy cases, then, a clear jurisdictional rule usually will be best. Narrowing the scope of the clear
rule to the easy cases—in which underlying policies are less in conflict and the tasks of creating and implementing a clear rule are
easier—is more feasible and justifiable than attempting to fit a single clear rule to all cases.
That does not mean that one must sacrifice the hard cases to the
clear rule when inaccuracy becomes more of a concern at the margins. One could imagine, instead, designing a hybrid doctrine that
uses a clear rule to address the easiest cases and an uncertain rule
to address the harder cases, with a multitude of resulting benefits.
The relatively narrow scope of the uncertain rule can restrict uncertainty primarily to a small subset of cases, leaving clarity over
the vast majority of cases and without sacrificing accuracy overall.
263

Id. at 6.
See 13D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3562 (3d
ed. 2008) (“[T]he cases raising a serious question whether jurisdiction exists are comparatively rare.”); Friedman, supra note 94, at 56 (“Uncertainty tends to play itself
out around the edges.”); Shapiro, supra note 96, at 1841 (arguing that “hard
cases . . . exist primarily at the margins” and “that the overwhelming majority of jurisdictional questions are straightforward and readily resolved”).
265
See Freer, supra note 53, at 342. That may not always have been the case. See
Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 35, at 2153 (arguing that Grable-type claims were
the norm in the nineteenth century).
264
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And, for the clear rule’s cases, the clarity in the rule should be clear
to lay persons as well and produce a similar clarity in results. The
costs of uncertainty will remain for the other cases, at least for a
time,266 but those will be a small subset, and that minimal cost may
be outweighed by the resulting gains in accuracy.
Institutionally, Congress and the courts can divide the burden of
designing the rule into components based on their respective capacities: Congress can design the clear component that governs
most cases (something that ought to be relatively easy even ex
ante) and delegate to the courts the responsibility of designing the
uncertain component for the hard cases, which may need more
time and case-specific development.
How might this actually look? I leave a comprehensive proposal
for another day, but let me offer a preliminary, if oversimplistic, illustration. Congress could incorporate the Holmes test as a test of
inclusion in Section 1331 but leave the generalized “arising under”
language available for other cases. Thus, the statute might include
Section 1331(b), which would state, “For purposes of Section
1331(a), a claim alleging a violation of a federally created right
‘arises under’ federal law.”267 That would make clear the primacy of
the Holmes test (and perhaps overrule troublesome cases like Bell
v. Hood268 and Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter269) while authorizing
the courts to continue the rarer and less certain Grable line of
cases270 for more nuanced treatment of claims that might still justify
the need for original federal jurisdiction.
This is an easy illustration, I confess, and no doubt the use of hybrid rules in other areas will run into its own problems and difficulties. Hybrid rules may prove to be as intractable as clear jurisdic266
It is a familiar hope that even uncertain doctrines will eventually result in greater
clarity as the doctrine becomes concretized over time. See Shapiro, supra note 89, at
546–47, 589 (arguing that discretionary doctrines tend to obtain clarity through the
process of precedent-building); Sunstein, supra note 56, at 965 (“It is a familiar hope
that standards will receive a degree of specification as they are interpreted . . . .”); cf.
Meltzer, supra note 19, at 1907 (arguing that the Younger abstention doctrine developed “relatively determinate boundaries” over the course of “a reasonably short
time”).
267
My thanks to Jay Tidmarsh for a friendly amendment to this language.
268
327 U.S. 678 (1946).
269
177 U.S. 505 (1900).
270
See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308
(2005); Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
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tional rules. But there are reasons to believe that hybrid rules have
some promise, and at least more promise than unified clear jurisdictional rules. The first step toward finding out is in acknowledging that overarching clarity in jurisdictional rules is inherently
complex, difficult, and, in most cases, illusory.
CONCLUSION
Henry Adams once denounced simplicity as “the most deceitful
mistress that ever betrayed man.”271 I have tried here to show that
the ideal of simple and clear jurisdictional rules is deceptively
complex and uncertain. And, at the very least, we ought to be skeptical of the mantra of clear and simple jurisdictional rules.
Perhaps I am biased—academics tend to have a preference for
the complex because, well, it gives us something to write and talk
about.272 But I have tried to acknowledge that jurisdictional clarity
and simplicity do have their place. They just need a narrower scope
to be able to accomplish what they have the capacity to accomplish. The same goes for jurisdictional complexity and uncertainty:
they can be used appropriately as well. The real value will come
from using both sets of features together in their respective roles.

271
272

Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams 441 (1918).
Schuck, supra note 73, at 34–38.

